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This Article argues that transnational financial transactions create new opportunities for pri-
vate groups to influence legal and regulatory rules. Internationalization of the financial markets has
led to harmonization of financial law. Much harmonization of financial law occurs through pro-
cesses that are apparently public, state-centered, and transparent, but this Article describes three
ways in which private and opaque processes have a significant influence on policy development in
the area of financial law. These are private international law-making through private involvement
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INTRODUCTION
In his 2004 Chorley lecture, Simon Roberts argued against
the modern trend to "loosen the conceptual bonds between law
and government."' Roberts is concerned that by expanding the
range of what we call law we undermine the meaning of the
descriptor.2 But he is also concerned that "under an onslaught
of jural discourse and institutional design, [the] distinctive val-
ues of negotiated order, far from being celebrated, are actually
effaced."'
In financial regulation4 it is easy to subscribe to this distinc-
tion between state-centered law and negotiated rules, whether
we describe them as "law" or not. It is common, for example, to
distinguish between governmental and "self-regulatory" rules.5
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1. Simon Roberts, After Government? On Representing Law Without the State, 68 MOD.
L. REv. 1, 1 (2005); see also id. at 17 ("If we try to represent law-or regulation-as other
than a dimension of governing we are surely losing our way.").
2. See id. at 24.
3. Id. at 23. Roberts describes the value of negotiated orders as follows: "Negoti-
ated orders have their own rationalities: they involve a different orientation to the nor-
mative repertoire from those of state law; decision-making is through agreement,
reached through cyclical processes of information exchange and learning, rather than
the imposed order of a third party; different forms of trust are necessarily involved." Id.
4. By focusing on the regulation of international financial activity (excluding infor-
mal financial transactions carried out through mechanisms such as hawala), I am neces-
sarily focusing on regulation produced by actors from developed economies and, in
particular, by actors from developed western economies.
5. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHos, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 28
(2000) ("The last two decades of the twentieth century saw the rise of a 'new regulatory
state,' where states do not so much run things as regulate them or monitor self-regula-
tion. Self-regulatory organizations frequently become more important than states in
the epistemic communities where debates over regulatory design are framed.").
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But this apparent sharp distinction between governmental and
self-regulation soon breaks down: self-regulatory organizations
often derive-or appear to derive-their [quasi] regulatory au-
thority from the State.6 Members of a Self-Regulatory Organiza-
tion ("SRO") may find that they have to look beyond their SRO
to assess the risk that they will be subject to enforcement action.7
Self-regulatory rules may be introduced in order to fend off for-
mal governmental regulation. At the same time, governmental
regulation may look very much like a negotiated order and may
give effect to private agendas.
The debate in financial regulation about the respective
weights that should be accorded to governmental and self-regu-
latory rules is a live one. At the end of 2004, the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") published a con-
cept release on self-regulation,8 and proposed new rules to apply
to SROs.9 Governments"' and international organizations" have
6. Stock exchanges have always been able to exercise quasi-regulatory powers.
Now they commonly exercise regulatory powers under the authority of statutes. See, e.g.,
SRO CONSULTATIVE COMM., INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS [IOSCO], MODEL FOR EFFEC-
TIVE REGULATION 3 (May 2000), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/
pdf/IOSCOPD110.pdf. The IOSCO report states that:
In several jurisdictions around the world, effective self-regulation existed
before statutory regulation. As markets developed, market participants recog-
nized that regulation was necessary in order to protect the integrity of the
market. Industry participants recognized that those who were most familiar
with the customs and practices of a particular trade were best suited to create
rules related to that trade, to enforce those rules and to resolve the disputes
that arose from those rules. Moreover, the familiarity with the concepts in-
volved ensured that such disputes were quickly resolved and that the rules for
commerce in that particular market continually and quickly adapted to the
evolutions in the manner in which trade was conducted.
Id.
7. See Jenny Anderson, A New Inquiry Into Big Board Specialists, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
2005, at C1 (reporting the Manhattan (S.D.N.Y.) U.S. Attorney's office investigation of
whether New York Stock Exchange members had cheated customers through illegal
trading practices).
8. See Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No.
50,700, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256 (Dec. 8, 2004).
9. See, e.g., Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations;
Disclosure and Regulatory Reporting by Self-Regulatory Organizations; Recordkeeping
Requirements for Self-Regulatory Organizations; Ownership and Voting Limitations for
Members of Self-Regulatory Organizations; Ownership Reporting Requirements for
Members of Self-Regulatory Organizations; Listing and Trading of Affiliated Securities
by a Self-Regulatory Organization, Exchange Act Release No. 50,699, 69 Fed. Reg.
71,126 (Dec. 8, 2004); see also Proposed Rule Changes of Self-Regulatory Organizations,
Exchange Act Release No. 50,486, 69 Fed. Reg. 60,287 (Oct. 8, 2004).
10. See, e.g., TASKFORCE ON INDUS. SELF-REGULATION, INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION IN
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examined how self-regulation does and can work in financial
markets. In recent years, SROs have been criticized for being
ineffective as regulators of financial market participants.1 2 In
January 2005, Charlie McCreevy, the European Union's internal
market commissioner, noted that governance of international
standard-setters was "becoming a subject of heated public de-
bate.""3 Credit Rating agencies, hitherto unregulated, may be
subject to some form of regulation in the future. 4
CONSUMER MARKETS, V, vii (Aug. 2000) (Austl.), available at http://www.consumerson-
line.gov.au/downloads/selfreg/taskforce/FinalReport/final-report.pdf. The Austra-
lian government set up a Taskforce on Self-Regulation, which reported that:
Self-regulation is increasingly being used as an alternative to quasi-regulation
and government legislation and there is some overlap between them. Identify-
ing best practice in self-regulation, and identifying the limits of self-regulatory
schemes, has important implications for the government's approach toward a
more efficient regulatory framework for both businesses and consumers. The
role of government in encouraging self-regulation also has an impact on com-
pliance costs, flexibility and the coverage of self-regulation.
Id. at v. The report also stated that "[t]he Government also has the objective that indus-
try should take increased ownership and responsibility for developing efficient and ef-
fective self-regulation where it is the most appropriate regulatory response." Id.
11. See, e.g., MODEL FOR EFFECTIVE REGULATION, supra note 6.
12. See, e.g., Media Advisory, California State Treasurer Phil Angelides et al., Re-
storing the Public's Trust in the New York Stock Exchange, at I (Sept. 24, 2003), availa-
ble at http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/news/releases/2003/20030924nyse.pdf A coalition
of state treasurers and pension fund leaders stated that:
[T]he disclosures that led to the resignation of Richard Grasso as the NYSE's
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer have revealed that some of the
problems that precipitated the market crisis of the past two years are reflected
in the conduct of the NYSE itself. It is clear that there is a need for fundamen-
tal, urgent, and sweeping reforms at the NYSE, to restore the faith and confi-
dence of investors.
Id. at 4. See also Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, supra note 8, at 71,259;
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n [SEC], SEC Charges National Stock Exchange and Its CEO, David
Colker, for Failure to Enforce Exchange Rules (May 19, 2005), available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/press/2005-79.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). Reena Aggarwal notes
some of these criticisms but describes advantages of SROs as follows: "SROs offer the
following advantages over government agencies: business interests, ability to self-police,
resources, close proximity to the markets, and flexibility." Reena Aggarwal, Regulatory
Infrastructure Covering Financial Markets, BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FIN. SERVS.,
2001, at 55, 74.
13. Charlie McCreevy, European Comm'r for Internal Mkt. & Servs., Governance
and Accountability in Fin. Servs., Speech at the Economic and Monetary Affairs Com-
mittee of European Parliament, Brussels (Feb. 2, 2005), available at http://europa.
eu.int/comm/commission-barroso/mccree\ry/speeches/index.en.htm (last visited
Oct. 18, 2005) ("The governance, financing, participation in and the accountability of
international standard setters, in particular the International Accounting Standards
Board, is becoming a subject of heated public debate.").
14. See, e.g., Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 70
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The argument that domestic financial regulation is influ-
enced by private sector groups through lobbying and capture is
not new. 5 Commentators have argued in the past that harmoni-
zation of regulation in the EU allows business groups to have a
greater influence on the development of rules than they would
at the domestic level.16 But the capture story is clearly not the
only story about regulation. At the domestic level, particularly in
an environment with competing regulators, regulators may seek
to appeal to different constituencies. State banking regulators in
the United States are now arguing against the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC")'s actions on preemption
by emphasizing that the state regulators protect individual con-
sumers of banking services more effectively than the OCC can.17
Financial firms do not always succeed in protecting themselves
from liability even where they are only doing what other similar
firms are doing.'"
Fed. Reg. 21,306 (proposed Apr.. 25, 2005); see also Press Release, Senate Comm. on
Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, Sen. Shelby Announces Banking Committee Priorities,
Planned Schedule for 109th Congress (Jan. 19, 2005), available at http://banking.sen-
ate.gov; COMM. ON GLOBAL FIN. Sys., BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS [BIS], THE ROLE OF
RATINGS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS (Jan. 2005), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs23.pdf; JOSCO TECHNICAL COMM., CODE OF CONDUCT
FUNDAMENTALS FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.iosco.
org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD18O.pdf; Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings
Under the Federal Securities Laws, Securities Act Release No. 8236, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 47,972, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,066, 68 Fed. Reg. 35,258
(June 12, 2003).
15. See, e.g., George Stigler, The Economic Theory of Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) ("A central thesis of this paper is that, as a rule, regulation is
acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit."); see
also Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision Making: A
Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 QuARTERLYJ. ECON. 1089 (1991). Cf John P. Burke,
Comm'r of Banking, State of Connecticut, Comments to the National Conference of
State Legislatures Annual Meeting, Salt Lake City, Utah (July 22, 2004), available at
http://www.csbs.org/pr/speeches/2004/JackBurkeNCSLAddress_072204.pdf
("[T]his amassing of control by Washington insiders is being compounded by the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission talking about additional centralization and a push
by the insurance industry to have a national charter not subject to state oversight or
regulation.").
16. See generally Stigler, supra note 15.
17. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 15, at 2-3. The Conference of State Bank Supervi-
sors, which describes itself as the "Champions of the State Banking System," includes
the following language in its Statement of Principles: "Bank supervision is best con-
ducted at the state level, where regulators are accessible and in tune with the local
economy." Conference of State Bank Supervisors [CSBS], CSBS Statement of Principles
(Dec. 2004), http://www.csbs.org (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
18. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Federal Court Approves Global Research Analyst
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This Article argues that transnational financial transactions
create new opportunities for private groups to influence legal
and regulatory rules. Internationalization of the financial mar-
kets has led to harmonization of financial law.19 Much harmoni-
zation of financial law occurs through processes that are appar-
ently public, state-centered, and transparent, 2° but this Article
describes three ways in which private and opaque processes have
a significant influence on policy development in the area of fi-
nancial law. These are private international law-making through
private involvement in public rule-making processes, through
contracting, and through the actions of private sector regulatory
entrepreneurs.
I. PRIVATE INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC
RULE-MAKING PROCESSES
Rules that affect participants in international financial trans-
actions may be adopted at the supranational level or at the do-
mestic level. Increasingly, supranational bodies are developing
harmonized rules or principles of financial regulation.2 ' Even
where supranational rule-making occurs, domestic legislation or
rule-making may be necessary for implementation. 22 It is neces-
sary, therefore, to distinguish between private involvement in the
work of supranational or transnational public rule-making
processes and private involvement in domestic public rule-mak-
ing processes. At the same time, developments at the suprana-
Settlement (Oct. 31, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/
lr18438.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2005) (describing setlement of SEC enforcement ac-
tions against ten investment firms alleging that investment banking interests affected
securities research at brokerage firms).
19. See, e.g., Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and its Effect on Developing
Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 97 (2002).
20. Note, however, that legislators often feel distanced from the harmonization
process. See, e.g., Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], IMF Deepens Dialogue with Central American
Legislators, 34 IMF SURVEY 178 (June 20, 2005), available at http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/pubs/ft/survey/2005/062005.pdf.
21. The EU produces binding rules, while bodies such as IOSCO produce formally
non-binding principles. Compare Council Directive No. 2004/39, O.J. L. 145/1 (2004),
with IOSCO, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION (May 2003), http://
www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD1 54.pdf.
22. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION,
INTERAGENCY STATEMENT-U.S. IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL II FRAMEWORK, QUALIFICA-
TION PROCESs-IRB AND AMA (Jan. 27, 2005), available at http://www.feder-
alreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2005/20050127/attachment.pdf.
2005]
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tional level can have a significant impact on domestic rule-mak-
ing (and vice versa) .23 Regulatory developments in one domes-
tic jurisdiction may have an impact on rule-making in another.24
As the volume and impact of supranational rules and princi-
ples has increased, financial firms and their trade associations
have begun to try to influence the development of these rules
and principles at the supranational level. 25 Processes which were
23. For example, the IMF has become more involved in recent years in issues of
financial regulation. See Independent Group to Review IMFs Financial Sector, Capital Markets
Work, 34 IMF SURVEY 169, 172 (June 20, 2005), available at http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/pubs/ft/survey/2005/062005.pdf. The IMF's biweekly magazine recently stated
that:
The rising importance of private capital flows and of a stable and well-func-
tioning financial sector have led to a greater emphasis on these areas in the
IMF's work. 'It is now time,' [IMF Managing Director Rodrigo] de Rato said,
'to review the ways in which the IMF has adapted.' Also, as part of an ongoing
strategic review of the IMF, the organization's Executive Board has asked that
increased attention be given to financial regulation and oversight and to the
determinants of capital flows and their regulation. 'This increased attention
would mean that in Article IV surveillance, IMF missions would increasingly
examine the regulations and environment in which domestic financial institu-
tions and private capital markets operate, with attention to factors governing
inward and outward flows of lending, equity investment, and direct foreign
investment,' de Rato stated.
Id.
24. Cf TRANSATLANTIC BUSINESS DIALOGUE, REPORT TO THE 2005 EU-U.S. SUMMIT,
A FRAMEWORK FOR DEEPENING TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT, at 7 (Apr. 1,
2005) [hereinafter TRANSATLANTIC BUSINESS DIALOGUE REPORT], available at http://
static.tabd.com/gems/TABD2005SummitReportFINAL062.PDF. The Transatlantic
Business Dialogue, a coalition of chief executives from U.S. and European companies,
recently stated in their report to the EU-U.S. Summit that:
In spite of the many ongoing regulatory dialogues, too often regulators de-
velop and implement rules, regulations and requirements on business in rela-
tive isolation. Since regulators are subject to entirely separate legal mandates
and legislative oversight, it is difficult for both business and administrations to
ensure that their concerns are heard. We respect that sovereign prerogatives
and legislative mandates must be taken into account, but we are concerned
that, if regulations continue to be developed on both sides of the Atlantic
without regard to the impact on the transatlantic market, divergent ap-
proaches will emerge which will negatively affect the ability of business to ex-
pand trade, investment and innovation. Recent regulatory actions (such as
Sarbanes-Oxley in the U.S., and the chemicals regulation in the EU) have
highlighted the need for regulators and legislators to consider the external
implications of their actions. It is vital to have a clear structure and process
across the transatlantic regulatory landscape, not just in a few sectors.
Id.
25. See generally SEC. INDUS. ASS'N [SIA], COMMENTS ON CESR DRAFT STATEMENT ON
CONSULTATION PRACTICES (Nov. 19, 2001), available at http://www.sia.com/2001_com-
men t letters/pdf/CESR.pdf
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originated as mechanisms of cooperation between domestic reg-
ulators have begun to look more like domestic regulatory
processes with increased input from non-State agents. These de-
velopments have occurred during the same period in which the
anti-globalization movement has motivated the international fi-
nancial institutions to focus on increasing the transparency of
their actions. 26 Supranational actors seek to increase their ap-
parent legitimacy by involving "stakeholders" or "civil society" in
their work. 27 Observers monitor governance in these suprana-
28tional organizations.
In the absence of generally agreed-upon procedures for su-
pranational governance, 29 standard-setters and those whose ac-
26. See, e.g., LEO VAN HOUTVEN, GOVERNANCE OF THE IMF: DECISION MAKING, INSTI-
TUTIONAL OVERSIGHT, TRANSPARENCY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY, IMF Pamphlet Series No.
53, at 2 (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/pam/pam53/
pam53.pdf (noting that some IMF critics argued that the IMF should be "more demo-
cratic, more transparent, more accountable, and more participatory"). Cf The Secre-
tary-General, Report of the Secretary General: In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Secur-
ity and Human Rights for All, 70, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/report-largerfreedom.pdf ("The Bretton Woods in-
stitutions have already taken some steps to strengthen the voice and participation of
developing countries. But more significant steps are needed to overcome the wide-
spread perception among developing countries that they are under-represented in both
bodies, which in turn tends to put their legitimacy in doubt.").
27. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT ON EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE (2003-
2004), at 4-5 (Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/governance/
docs/rapport-gouvernance_2003-2004_en.pdf. Governments and public agencies, in-
cluding the Bank for International Settlements ("BIS"), the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"),
the Bank of England, and the U.S. Federal Reserve, publicize their research papers
through the Social Science Research Network at http://www.ssrn.com.
28. See, e.g., HETTY KOVACH, CAROLINE NELIGAN & SIMON BURALL, POWER WITHOUT
ACCOUNTABILITY? THE GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (2003), available at http://www.
oneworldtrust.org/documents/GAP2003.pdf.
29. The World Bank and IMF have been working on issues of governance for some
time, although their focus has mostly been on domestic governance. See, e.g., WORLD
BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005: A BETTER INVESTMENT CLIMATE FOR EVERY-
ONE 1 (2004), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTArDR2005/Re-
sources/completereport.pdf. The World Bank's 2005 World Development Report
states that:
Government policies and behaviors play a key role in shaping the investment
climate. While governments have limited influence on factors such as geogra-
phy, they have more decisive influence on the security of property rights, ap-
proaches to regulation and taxation (both at and within the border), the pro-
vision of infrastructure, the functioning of finance and labor markets, and
broader governance features such as corruption. Improving government poli-
cies and behaviors that shape the investment climate drives growth and
reduces poverty.
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tivities their standards may affect are negotiating principles of
governance.30 Financial trade associations argue that regulation
in the global capital markets should be transparent.3 1 For exam-
ple, the Securities Industry Association ("SIA") says that: 1)
rules should be adopted only for legitimate public policy objec-
tives; 2) they should be enforced fairly, and not retrospectively;
3) they should be publicly available; and 4) they should be "clear
and understandable. 13 2 None of these claims appears to be con-
troversial, although there is scope for debate about when a rule
is or is not adopted for legitimate public policy objectives, or
when rules are "clear and understandable."
Financial firms and their trade associations have a clear in-
centive to participate in negotiations about governance proce-
dures in supranational standard setting bodies. The Basel Capi-
tal Accord taught banks that they needed to pay attention to su-
pranational standards because these standards could affect their
bottom line. The EU's financial market integration project also
gives financial firms incentives to pay attention to supranational
rules.33 But other groups, such as financial firms' customers, do
not have such immediate incentives to participate in these
processes. Moreover, they often lack the resources to participate
effectively. Effective participation in consultations about finan-
cial regulation requires time and expertise 4.3  It also usually re-
Id.; see also DANIEL KAUFMANN, AART KRAAY & MASSIMO MASTRUZZI, GOVERNANCE MAT-
TERS IV: GOVERNANCE INDICATORS FOR 1996-2004 (2005) (draft May 9, 2005), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/GovMatters%201V%20main.pdf.
The World Bank and IMF have begun to comment on governance issues in suprana-
tional standard-setters. See, e.g., World Bank & IMF, Comments on Draft IOSCO Consulta-
tion Policy and Procedures, in IOSCO, PUBLIC COMMENTS RECEIVED ON IOSCO's DRAr
CONSULTATION POLICY AND PROCEDURES 9 (Feb. 2005) [hereinafter IOSCO PUBLIC COM-
MENTS], available at http://iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD191.pdf.
30. See, e.g., infta note 64 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., SIA, supra note 25, at 2-3.
32. Id.; see also Promoting Fair and Transparent Regulation (SIA Discussion Paper,
Aug. 31, 2000), available at http://www.sia.com/2001_comment-letters/pdf/CESR_--
Appendix.pdf.
33. See, e.g., infra note 121 and accompanying text.
34. Financial firms and their trade associations sponsor research. For example,
the NASDAQ Educational Foundation sponsors research and education to "promote
learning about capital formation, financial markets and entrepreneurship through in-
novative educational programs." NASDAQ Stock Market Educational Foundation, Inc.,
2005 Grant Guidelines (2005), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/services/2005-
grant-guide.doc (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). In mid-2005, NASDAQ discontinued a
broader program of engagement with the academic community. The Federation of
European Stock Exchanges awards the Josseph de la Vega prize annually for research
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quires a good knowledge of English. 5 Financial regulation is
often highly technical and detailed, and, at the supranational
level, as at the domestic level, the stakeholders who speak
loudest and most frequently are regulated financial firms and
their trade associations.
Because harmonization of financial regulation occurs at dif-
ferent levels-supranational, national, sub-national-or layers,
through processes of agreement and implementation of stan-
dards, and because each level of decision-maker is likely to invite
public comment on its work, the harmonization process multi-
plies the possibilities for well-resourced organizations to influ-
ence rule content. A large financial firm or financial trade asso-
ciation is more likely than a small firm to know what proposals
exist around the world which may ultimately affect its (or its
members') business, and it is more likely than a smaller organi-
zation to have the resources to try to affect the development of
the rules. Large well-resourced organizations adopt complex
strategies of working together and separately in order to maxi-
mize the effectiveness of their voices. Smaller firms', investors',
and depositors' voices may be lost in the hubbub around rule-
making created by larger firms and their trade associations. 6
on the securities markets. See Fed'n of European Stock Exchs., The Josseph de la Vega
Prize, http://www.fese.be/delavega/index.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). The Cham-
ber of Commerce argued that the SEC should have paid more attention than it did to a
paper funded by Fidelity Investments in considering how to regulate investment com-
pany boards. See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 412 F.3d 133,
142 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("The particulars of the Chamber's first contention are that the
Commission should have directed its staff to do a study of the effect of an independent
chairman upon fund performance and that when such a study, commissioned by Fidel-
ity Investments, was presented during the comment period, the Commission gave it
short shrift.").
35. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
36. Cf Section for External Relations, European Econ. & Soc. Comm., Opinion on
The Social Dimension of Globalisation-The EU's Policy Contribution on Extending the Benefits
to All, at 1.5 (2005) (referring to "the findings of the World Commission on the Social
Dimension of Globalization (WCSDG) that market-opening measures and financial and
economic considerations have predominated, neglecting their social consequences so
far and that these rules and policies are the outcome of a system of global governance
insufficiently responsive to the interests and needs of the less powerful players"). See also
Communication from the European Commission, European Governance: Better Lawmak-
ing, at 3 (June 5, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2002/
com2002_0275en01.pdf ("Are the Smallest Voices Really and Always Heard?").
20051
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A. Transnational Rule-Making
Transnational standard-setting bodies such as the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision,3 7 International Organiza-
tion of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"),"8 the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"),39 and
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors ("IAIS")40
involve technocratic networks of regulators from different States
working together to develop harmonized standards for banking,
securities and insurance regulation.41 Other principles that af-
fect financial firms relating to money laundering and terrorist
financing controls are developed by the Financial Action Task
Force on Money Laundering ("FATF"), a body established by the
G7 nations in 1989.42 By definition, such inter-governmental
bodies operate at a distance from national democratic
processes." The Basel Committee, the OECD, and the FATF are
37. See generally GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION, supra note 5 (describing how Cen-
tral Bank Governors established what is now the Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion in response to the failures of the Herstaat Bank and Franklin National Bank in
1974).
38. IOSCO is the International Organization of Securities Commissions, a forum
for coordinating approaches to securities regulation. IOSCO's web site is at http://
www.iosco.org. For a discussion of IOSCO's Principles of Securities Regulation, see Pis-
tor, supra note 19, at 116-20.
39. The OECD has addressed issues of financial regulation and governance. See,
e.g., OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR INSURERS' GOVERNANCE (Apr. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/10/34799740.pdf; OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR
PENSION FUND GOVERNANCE (Apr. 28, 2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/18/52/34799965.pdf; OECD, White Paper on Governance of Collective Investment
Schemes, 88 FIN. MKT. TRENDS 137 (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/10/10/34572343.pdf.
40. IAIS is the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, a cooperative
organization of insurance supervisors. The IAIS website is at http://www.iaisweb.org.
41. For general information on the activities of these standard-setting bodies, see
http://bis.org, http://www.iosco.org, http://www.oecd.org, and http://iaisweb.org.
42. See, e.g., FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING [FATF], ANNUAL RE-
PORT FOR 2003-2004, at 3 (July 2, 2004) [hereinafter FATF ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2003-
2004], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/12/44/33622501.PDF. The FATF
has adopted forty recommendations on money laundering and nine special recommen-
dations on terrorist financing. See FATF, THE FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS (June 20, 2003),
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/38/47/34030579.PDF; see also FATF, SPE-
CIAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON TERRORIST FINANCING (Oct. 31, 2001), available at http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/55/16/34266142.pdf; FATF, DETECTING AND PREVENTING
THE CROss-BORDER TRANSPORTATION OF CASH BY TERRORISTS AND OTHER CRIMINALS, IN-
TERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES (Feb. 12, 2005), available at http://www.faff-gafi.org/
dataoecd/50/63/34424128.PDF.
43. See generally http://www.fatf-gafi.org (describing the Financial Action Task
Force on Money Laundering ("FATF") as "a policy-making body, which works to gener-
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bodies with limited memberships, composed of representatives
from a relatively small number of States.44 Even IOSCO and
JAIS, which have more inclusive membership arrangements,
tend to be dominated by members from northern, economically
developed States.4" The actions of these supranational standard-
setters are not subject to the sort of controls that apply to domes-
tic administrative agencies." Firms and people who may be af-
fected by their pronouncements do not have opportunities to
challenge these pronouncements in court.4 7
The International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and the World
Bank encourage States to comply with the standards that bodies
such as the FATF, the Basel Committee, and IOSCO produce,48
so that the standards may have significant practical impact al-
though they are not formally binding.49 On the other hand,
ate the necessary political will to bring about national legislative and regulatory reforms
in these areas"). For more information on the non-binding policy generated by the
Basel Committee, IOSCO, and IAIS, see supra note 41.
44. See Kovach et al., supra note 28, at v (noting that the Group of Ten (GI0),
whose members form the Basel Committee, is "made up of a few privileged BIS mem-
bers, located within the BIS but not ultimately accountable to it and its fifty members").
45. See, e.g., David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Adminis-
tration 2-3 (IILJ Working Paper 2004/6, June 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/so3/papers.cfm?abstractid=692764 (last visited Oct. 18, 2005) (noting the non-
participation of developing countries in supranational financial rule-making).
46. See id. at 1 ("This transformation has removed the regulation of goods and
services from domestic rulemaking and transformed it into a matter for supranational
agreement. It has taken review away from the courts and made administration an exer-
cise in bureaucratic collaboration.").
47. Cf European Commission, Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dia-
logue-General Principles and Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the
Commission, at 10, COM (2002) 704 final (Dec. 11, 2002), available at http://eu-
ropa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2002/com2OO2_O704en0l.pdf ("IT]he Commission
remains convinced that a legally-binding approach to consultation is to be avoided, for
two reasons: First, a clear dividing line must be drawn between consultations launched
on the Commission's own initiative prior to the adoption of a proposal, and the subse-
quent formalized and compulsory decisionmaking process according to the Treaties.
Second, a situation must be avoided in which a Commission proposal could be chal-
lenged in the Court on the grounds of alleged lack of consultation of interested parties.
Such an over-legalistic approach would be incompatible with the need for timely deliv-
ery of policy, and with the expectations of the citizens that the European Institutions
should deliver on substance rather than concentrating on procedures.").
48. On the IMF's Standards and Codes Initiative, see, for example, http://www.
imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sc.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). See also Alastair
Clark, International Standards and Codes, FIN. STABILITY REv., Issue 09, Dec. 14, 2000, at
162, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2000/fsrO9art7.
pdf.
49. See, e.g., Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, http://
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standards established by the FATF, the Basel Committee, or
IOSCO will typically produce a direct impact on firms only when
they are implemented within a domestic regulatory system.50 A
domestic regulator is subject to the rules that normally apply to
administrative action within its domestic system when it consid-
ers how to implement supranational rules domestically.5' How-
ever, whether because of urging by the international financial
institutions or by financial firms, rules developed in transna-
tional standard-setting bodies may benefit from a presumption
of acceptability when they are considered by a domestic legisla-
tor or regulator. It is also probably easier for regulators from the
countries that make most of the international standards than for
regulators from the countries that do not to decide to adjust the
standards for domestic conditions.52 Thus, it is possible that
people and firms who did not participate in consultations by the
international standard-setting organizations may have more op-
portunity to express their views on a proposed domestic imple-
mentation in some countries-the more powerful countries-
than in others.53
The EU's program for developing harmonized financial
regulation differs from the activities of the Basel Committee and
IOSCO in a number of ways.54 First, the EU's harmonized rules
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa04.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). Note, how-
ever, that members of the IMF do have an obligation, under Article IV of the IMF
Articles of Agreement, "to collaborate with the Fund and other members to assure or-
derly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates." Id.
50. See Zaring, supra note 45, at 10 ("For example, American banking regulators
have generally treated the Committee's theoretically voluntary proposals as the basis for
quick domestic regulatory action.").
51. Cf id. at 10-11 (describing how U.S. bank regulators have implemented Basel
Committee amendments).
52. See, e.g.,Joint Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion, Banking Agencies To Perform Additional Analysis Before Issuing Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking Related To Basel II (Apr. 29, 2005), available at http://www.
occ.treas.gov/scripts/newsrelease.aspx?JNR=&Doc=KLDCDKRC.xml (last visited Oct.
18, 2005).
53. Cf Zaring, supra note 45, at 11 ("Recently, the Fed, the OCC, and other do-
mestic banking agencies with memberships on the committee act in unison, with one
comment period, a collective response, and quick domestic implementation of the in-
ternational rule.").
54. The EU and the United States are discussing enhanced regulatory coopera-
tion. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament
and the European Economic and Social Committee-A Stronger EU-U.S. Partnership and a More
Open Market for the 21st Century, COM (2005) 196 final (May 18, 2005).
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are binding on the EU Member States.55 Member States may not
have much discretion about how they go about implementing
the rules agreed upon in EU directives. 56 In addition, the EU
Parliament has, and exercises, the right to be involved in the
development of the EU's harmonized rules for financial regula-
tion. 57 Thus, the EU's measures have a more binding quality,
and more democratic input, than harmonized rules or princi-
ples developed in other fora.58
International and regional organizations that develop rules
and standards for international financial activity have recently
been taking steps to enhance the transparency of their
processes. 59 The FATF may be distinguished from other finan-
cial standard-setters, because although it publicizes its work
through its website, it does not use the website to seek public
comments on its work. The development of money-laundering
and terrorist-financing controls is treated as an aspect of law en-
forcement rather than as an aspect of financial regulation6 ° even
55. See generally Comm. of Wise Men, Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men
on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, 28 (Feb. 15, 2001) [hereinafter
Lamfalussy Report], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/fi-
nances/general/lamfalussyen.pdf. The EU's harmonization measures are now sepa-
rated into framework measures and more detailed implementing measures. The idea is
that the more detailed implementing rules could be changed more easily, thus ensur-
ing that the rules could adjust to changing circumstances. This new arrangement was
introduced after the Lamfalussy Report.
56. See, e.g., Fin. Servs. Auth. [FSA] (UK), The Listing Review and Implementation of
the Prospectus Directive, (Consultative Paper 04/16, Oct. 2004), at 12, 2.6, available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp04-16.pdf (noting that FSA was consulting in rela-
tion to areas where FSA had discretion in implementation of directive).
57. See, e.g., European Parliament Resolution on the Final Report of the Commit-
tee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, O.J. C 343/265
(2001).
58. The EU is more democratic in its processes than it was, and more democratic
than other international organizations. See, e.g., id. at 4 (noting "the importance of
ensuring that the proposed Regulators and Securities Committees are democratically
accountable").
59. See, e.g.,Joint Press Release, Int'l Org. of Sec. Comm'ns, Basel Comm. on Bank-
ing Supervision, Int'l Assoc. of Ins. Supervisors, The World Bank & The Fin. Stability
Forum, International Regulators and Related Organizations Announce the Public In-
terest Oversight Board for the International Accounting Profession (Feb. 28, 2005),
available at http://www.bis.org/press/p050228.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
60. See, e.g., FATF, METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THE FATF 40
RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE FATF 9 SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS, at 2 (Feb. 27, 2004),
available at http://fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/45/15/34864111.pdf (arguing that an effec-
tive anti-money laundering system and the combating of the financing of terrorism re-
quire laws that create money-laundering and terrorist-financing offenses and provide
for the freezing, seizing and confiscation of criminal proceeds and terrorist funding).
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though much of the burden of implementing the resulting rules
is borne by financial firms.6 As money-laundering and terrorist-
financing control is an enterprise of law enforcement, the exper-
tise that is valued in the process of developing standards is law
enforcement and regulatory expertise rather than financial sec-
632tor expertise.
In contrast to the FATF, the Basel Committee, IOSCO, and
the IAIS all publish documents including their proposed rules
and standards through their websites in order to publicize their
work and also to invite public comment.6 3 Financial trade as-
sociations welcome moves to greater public consultation.6 4 How-
ever, although some international standard-setters have worked
to increase the transparency of their processes, 65 there is as yet
no one method of encouraging public participation, or even of
describing the results of a consultation exercise.6 6 This is not
surprising given that domestic rules regulating the rule-making
activities of regulatory agencies vary,6 7 and the international
standard-setters include members from different jurisdictions
61. See generally id. (calling for laws that impose the required obligations on finan-
cial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions).
62. See, e.g., FATF ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2003-2004, supra note 42, at 3 ("The delega-
tions of the Task Force's members are drawn from a wide range of disciplines, includ-
ing experts from the Ministries of Finance, Justice, Interior and External Affairs, finan-
cial regulatory authorities and law enforcement agencies.").
63. See supra note 41.
64. See, e.g., Int'l Sec. Mkt. Ass'n [ISMA], Int'l Primary Mkt. Ass'n, Danish Sec.
Dealers Ass'n, London Inv. Banking Ass'n, Swedish Sec. Dealers Ass'n, PUBLIC COM-
MENTS BY THE ABoVE ASSOCIATIONS ON IOSCO's CONSULTATION REPORT ON CODE OF
CONDUCT FUNDAMENTALS FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (Nov. 2004), available at http://
www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD177-25.pdf ("We also recognize that publica-
tion of the Code for consultation is part of IOSCO's evolving policy of greater public
consultation, the objectives of which, as set out in IOSCO's recent draft Statement of
Consultation Policy, we endorse and on which we will comment in due course.").
65. See, e.g., EXECUTIVE COMM. OF THE INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'RS, IOSCO CON-
SULTATION POLICY AND PROCEDURE 2 (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.iosco.org/li-
brary/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD197.pdf (stressing that IOSCO aims to "continue to in-
crease transparency regarding IOSCO's activities").
66. See id. at 3 ("IOSCO will maintain a flexible approach to public consulta-
tions.").
67. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Remarks at the Conferment of an Honorary De-
gree in Jurisprudence from the University of Rome, La Sapienza (June 13, 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.law.nyu.edu/newscalendars/faculty/2004_2005/stewart/lasapienza.
html (last visited Oct. 18, 2005) (noting that "one can speak of a French-Italian model
of administrative law, a German model, an Anglo-Commonwealth model, [or] a U.S.
model").
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with different approaches to administrative procedure.68 A
growing literature focuses on examining and critiquing adminis-
trative procedures for global governance, 6 but there is as yet no
global standard for supranational administrative procedures.7"
Documents on very technical subjects may produce limited
numbers of comments. For example, when the Basel Committee
sought information and views on credit risk modelling it re-
ceived twenty-two responses.7 Of these responses, nine were
from individual banks or industry associations, five from academ-
ics or academic organizations and five from representatives of
the consulting, accounting or risk management professions.72
This Summary of Responses does not name any of the respon-
dents. 73 In some cases, it may be difficult to discern from the
standard-setter's description of the results of consultations not
only who commented on a publication or proposal but even how
many people and firms commented.74 In other cases, the stan-
dard-setter may publish the text of comments received on its web
pages.75
The Basel Committee's work is carried out by representa-
tives of banking regulators and central banks from the GlO
76 7countries. IOSCO has a much larger,77 tripartite membership,
68. See id. (pointing out that a "congeries of different actors-international and
domestic, public and private-interact in a kaleidoscope of different configurations,
together forming a variegated 'global administrative space' that resembles nothing so
much as a Jackson Pollock painting").
69. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Adminis-
trative Law, 69 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2005), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=723147 (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
70. See id. ("[T]he past several decades have witnessed an explosive development
of a great variety of international economic and social regulatory regimes.").
71. See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, SUMMARY OF RESPONSES RE-
CEIVED ON THE REPORT "CREDIT RISK MODELLING: CURRENT PRACTICES AND APPLICA-
TIONS," at I (May 2000), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs71.pdf.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See, e.g., IOSCO TECHNICAL COMM., PRINCIPLES ON OUTSOURCING OF FINANCIAL
SERVICES FOR MARKET INTERMEDIARIES, NOTICE OF FINAL REPORT, SURVEY AND SUMMARY
OF COMMENTS (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOS-
COPD186.pdf. Such an approach is consistent with the view that in the context of
regulatory processes it is the ideas, rather than their level of support, which matter.
75. See, e.g., PUBLIC COMMENTS ON CODE OF CONDUCT FUNDAMENTALS FOR CREDIT
RATING AGENCIES, available at http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD1 77.pdf.
76. For background information on the Basel Committee, see http://www.bis.org/
about/factbcbs.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
77. See, e.g., Philippe Richard, IOSCO Sec'y Gen., Report From the Secretary-General,
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including ordinary members, associate members, and affiliate
members. IOSCO's ordinary members are securities regula-
tors.7 s Only ordinary members have the right to vote, although
associate members participate in IOSCO's President's Commit-
tee and affiliate members which are SROs participate in
IOSCO's SRO Consultative Committee. 79  The associate mem-
bers and affiliate members contribute through their member-
ship fees to IOSCO's finances.8s IOSCO's affiliate members in-
clude financial exchanges, non-exchange SROs, and interna-
tional organizations." IOSCO says that it "recognizes the
importance of maintaining a close dialogue with the SROs and
international organizations that make up its affiliate member-
ship and of allowing them to make a constructive input in the
work of the Organization.""2
The IAIS also has a large membership, including insurance
supervisors and regulators from over one hundred and sixty ju-
in IOSCO ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004, 16, 18 (2004), available at http://www.iosco.org/
annual report/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2005) (noting that IOSCO's membership currently
totaled 174, and that the comprehensive extent of its membership clearly demonstrates
"that it truly represents the international community of international securities regula-
tors and that it is the international standard setter for securities marketers").
78. In ajurisdiction where there is no governmental regulatory body, an SRO may
be allowed to become an ordinary member of IOSCO. See IOSCO ANNUAL REPORT FOR
2004, supra note 77, at 24.
79. See id. at 23.
80. In 2003, IOSCO incurred a loss of 291,579 Euros. See id. at 28. A number of
IOSCO members have been in arrears with their membership fees:
At the end of 2003 outstanding membership fees of more than one year stood
at slightly over 50,000 Euros. The Presidents Committee unfortunately had to
aggravate, in accordance with Part 12 of the By-Laws, a sanction imposed to
the Comision Nacional de Valores of Paraguay ("CNVP") for repeated failure
to pay its prescribed annual financial contribution. The IOSCO membership
of the CNVP was therefore suspended. The Superintendencia de Valores of
Colombia is also currently the object of a Presidents Committee sanction for
similar reasons. Its voting right was suspended in 2002 and that situation con-
tinued in 2003.
IOSCO ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2003, at 18 (2003). The IAIS also incurred a loss in 2003.
See INT'L Ass'N OF INS. SUPERVISORS (AIS), ANNUAL REPORT 2003-04, at 16 (Sept. 2001)
[hereinafter IAIS ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2003] (highlighting that total expenses exceeded
total unrestricted revenues and gains).
81. See generally IOSCO website, http://www.iosco.org/lists.
82. IOSCO ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004, supra note 77, at 21. The SRO Consultative
Committee works with IOSCO's Technical Committee. See id. ("The SRO Consultative
Committee has designated contact persons with the Technical Committee Standing
Committees and Project Teams and is therefore able to provide substantive input re-
lated to their regulatory initiatives.").
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risdictions8 3 The JAIS also has a special membership category
for "observers," that includes private-sector entities.8 4 The IAIS
seeks to involve observers in the work of its Technical Commit-
tee.85 LAIS observers generate significant amounts of revenue
for IAIS, which may be important given that the organization has
suffered from a mismatch between revenues in U.S. dollars and
expenses in Swiss francs in recent years.86
In contrast to the Basel Committee, which does not depend
on the private sector for its financing, 7 both IOSCO and the
LAIS are partly dependent on financing from non-governmental
entities which participate in their standard-setting processes.88
In the case of IOSCO, the non-governmental entities are SROs,
so they perform combined functions of regulation and member
interest representation. 9 In the case of IAIS, the non-govern-
mental members include insurance companies, accounting
firms, and law firms.9" IOSCO's accounts do not identify the rel-
ative contributions of SRO and governmental members, but
83. See IAIS ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2003, supra note 80, at iv.
84. See id. (noting that "more than 70 organizations and individuals are observers"
and that "[t] hey represent professional associations, insurance and reinsurance compa-
nies, international financial institutions, consultants and other professionals").
85. See id. at 8 ("During the year the Technical Committee working parties have
continued to receive substantial support from IAIS observers. They have been gener-
ous in providing input and comments on a range of issues when requested and respect-
ful of supervisory concerns. Each working party has developed a unique relationship
with the observer community that suits both its needs and operating style. This partner-
ship has been productive and has served to improve the quality and relevance of the
output.").
86. See id. at 16 (showing that in 2003, observer membership fees were US$355,000
and member fees were US$655,000); see also id. at 13.
87. In 2001 the BIS decided at an Extraordinary General Meeting that it should be
owned only by central banks and that it would mandatorily repurchase its shares in
private ownership. See BIS, Withdrawal of All Shares of the Bank for International Settlements
Held by Private Shareholders (Oct. 13, 2003), available at http://www.bis.org/about/
shareswd.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). On a challenge by some of the private owners
the mandatory repurchase was found to be lawful by an arbitral tribunal. See Reineccius
et al. v. Bank for Int'l Settlements (Perm. Ct. Arb., Nov. 22, 2002), Permanent Court of
Arbitration, Arbitral Tribunal Established Pursuant to Article XV of the Agreement
Signed at the Hague on 20 January 1930, Partial Award on the Lawfulness of the Recall
of the Privately Held Shares on 8 January 2001 and the Applicable Standards for Valua-
tion of Those Shares (Nov. 22, 2002), available at http://pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/
BIS/EPA.pdf.
88. See IOSCO ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004, supra note 77, at 23, 36-43 (listing ordi-
nary members which include non-governmental bodies); see also IAIS website, http://
www.iaisweb.org (last visited Oct. 18, 2005) (listing IAIS member organizations).
89. See, e.g., IOSCO ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004, supra note 77, at 15, 21, 23, 4142.
90. See generally IAIS website, supra note 88.
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IAIS's accounts show that it benefits financially from the partici-
pation of non-governmental entities in its membership. 91 The
International Financial Standards Board, which is a non-govern-
mental entity rather than an inter-governmental or inter-regula-
tory entity, has been criticized on the basis that its reliance on
private sector financial resources might create conflicts of inter-
est.
9 2
Consultation procedures may be more or less formalized
and/or theorized. Whereas the Basel Committee has not articu-
lated in any formal way what principles it applies in the context
of its consultations with interested parties,93 IOSCO published a
consultation document about its consultation procedures in No-
vember 2004.14 IOSCO's document suggested that it was con-
cerned with a broadly defined group of interests.95 In describing
its objectives in consulting, IOSCO said that it wanted:
To benefit from the expertise of market intermediaries, ex-
changes and other market operators, securities clearing and
settlement system service providers, end-users and consum-
ers, auditors and auditing companies, and other public au-
thorities, international standard setters, international finan-
cial institutions, and regional development banks, when as-
sessing and analyzing regulatory issues.9 6
IOSCO's draft also described the advantages IOSCO saw in
increasing the transparency of its operations as being "to en-
hance the perceived fairness and openness of IOSCO's decision-
making process and the visibility and acceptability of its re-
sults."9 7 IOSCO also suggested that it has an interest in ensuring
91. See generally IAIS ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2003, supra note 80.
92. See, e.g., McCreevy, supra note 13, at 5 ("The standard setters are currently
sponsored by voluntary contributions from contributors ranging from central banks to
listed companies, which raises potential issues of conflict of interest. I therefore wel-
come the Board of Trustees of the IASB's intention to change this.").
93. See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, About Basel Committee, http://
Nvvw.bis.org/bcbs/aboutbcbs.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005) (stating broadly that the
"Committee has always encouraged contacts and cooperation between its members and
other banking supervisory authorities," without specifying any specific procedure).
94. See IOSCO, IOSCO CONSULTATION POLICY AND PROCEDURES, DRAFT FOR PUBLIC
CONSULTATION (Nov. 2004) [hereinafter IOSCO DRAFT CONSULTATION POLICY], availa-
ble at http://iosco.org/libiary/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD175.pdf.
95. See id.
96. Id. at 2.
97. Id.
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consistent approaches to common concerns."8 Finally, the docu-
ment suggested that IOSCO would usually publish comments in
an anonymous format on its website. 9 In February 2005,
IOSCO published the full text of nine comments on this consul-
tation document. 00 Commenters asked for more information
about IOSCO's priorities and agenda,10 1 more time to react to
IOSCO's proposals, 10 2 and opportunities to be involved in dis-
cussing ideas before a formal consultation." 3 The International
Bar Association argued that IOSCO should not publish com-
ments anonymously:
[W] e submit that IOSCO should not permit any consultations
to take place with comments which are anonymous to the
public. We understand that internal regulatory deliberations
must and should be confidential. Once any proposal is posted
for consultation, however, all comments, both formal and in-
formal, should be made in full transparency with attribution,
and the extent to which IOSCO is meeting with or receiving
information from interested companies, lobbyists or groups
should be apparent to all. We therefore recommend that all
submissions after the publication of the consultation should
be public and easily accessible.'1 4
In April 2005, IOSCO published a report on its Consulta-
98. See id.
99. See id. at 4.
100. See IOSCO PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 29.
101. See, e.g., id. at 5-6, 8, 15 (Comments by the Assogestioni, European Fund and
Asset Management Association ("FEFSI"), and International Banks and Securities Asso-
ciation ("IBSA") on IOSCO's Draft Consultation Policies and Procedure).
102. See, e.g., id. at 6, 8, 23-24 (Comments by the Assogestioni, FEFSI, and London
Investment Banking Association ("LIBA') on IOSCO's Draft Consultation Policies and
Procedure).
103. See, e.g., id. at 11. The International Council of Securities Associations com-
ments on IOSCO's Draft Consultation Policies and Procedure stated that:
The period prior to a formal consultation is a critical and often underap-
preciated stage in the consultation process. Therefore, we urge IOSCO to
place greater stress on consulting with market participants and other in-
formed parties prior to beginning work on a consultation document in order
to determine the need for regulatory action and, if such a need exists, what
action would be appropriate. Contacts with market participants and other in-
formed parties during this preparatory phase would help focus the debate on
the most important and material issues.
Id.
104. Id. at 18 (Comments of the International Bar Association on IOSCO's Draft
Consultation Policies and Procedure).
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tion Policy and Procedure. 10 5 Strikingly, while the November
2004 draft referred to IOSCO's interest in benefiting from the
expertise of a wide range of potential consultees, including con-
sumers, 1 6 the April 2005 Report refers merely to its objective of
benefiting from "the expertise of the international financial
community. ' 10 7 Although the Report refers more than once to
the "public," the word "consumer" appears nowhere. 10 8 The
April Report also suggests that IOSCO will consider engaging in
"pre-consultations,"' 9 and that comments will be published un-
less "anonymity is specifically required."110
The EU adopts binding rules of financial regulation as di-
rectives."' Under the Lamfalussy approach, EU financial regu-
lation directives should be framework measures, and the de-
tailed implementing rules should be adopted through a
comitology procedure involving CESR.1 2 The EU's legislative
process takes account of the views of civil society through the
participation of the Economic and Social Committee."' The
105. See IOSCO, REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITrEE OF IOSCO, IOSCO CON-
SULTATION POLICY & PROCEDURE (Apr. 2005) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE RE-
PORT], available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD197.pdf.
106. See IOSCO DRAFr CONSULTATION POLICY, supra note 94, at 2.
107. EXECUTIVE CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 105, at 2.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id.
111. See About EU Law, Process and Players, 1 1.3.3, http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/en/droitcommunautaire/droit communautaire.htm (last visited Nov. 4,
2005) ("Adopted by the Council in conjunction with the European Parliament or by the
Commission alone, a directive is addressed to the Member States. Its main purpose is
to align national legislation. A directive is binding on the Member States as to the
result to be achieved but leaves them the choice of the form and method they adopt to
realise the Community objectives within the framework of their internal legal order.");
see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art.
249, O.J. C. 325/1 (2002), at 132 ("A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the na-
tional authorities the choice of form and methods.").
112. See CHARLIE MCCREEW, EUROPEAN COMM'R FOR INrERNAL MKT. & SERVS., BET-
TER REGULATION AND THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR 4 (June 21, 2005), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissionbarroso/mccreevy/docs/speeches/2005-06-
21/regulation-en.pdf ("A clear legal framework is necessary for the efficient operation
of both financial market participants and their regulators and supervisors... full coop-
eration among the supervisory committees (CEBS [the Committee of European Bank-
ing Supervisors], CEIOPS [the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Supervisors] and CESR [the Committee of European Securities Regulators])
is also needed to ensure consistent and coherent application of European rules.") (al-
teration added).
113. See The Role of EU Consultative Bodies, Economic and Social Committee,
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EU Commission has been making consistent efforts to ensure
that the views of businesses in particular are taken into account
in the regulatory process by setting up a European Business Test
Panel. 14
In theory, the EU directives should set the general frame-
work within which the EU's detailed implementing rules should
operate."' The EU's legislative process for producing the
framework directives is often a lengthy one involving many op-
portunities for interested parties to express their views on pro-
posals. For example, the Markets in Financial Instruments Di-
rective ("MiFID") adopted in 2004116 replaces the Investment
Services Directive of 1993.117 In 2000, the Commission pub-
lished a Communication on revising the Investment Services Di-
rective in which it sought comments on a number of issues.'
Forty-two respondents, including regulators and market partici-
pants, commented on this Communication."' The Commission
followed up with a larger consultation exercise, including an
open hearing. 20 This second consultation produced sixty-nine
comments almost entirely from market participants and regula-
tors, with one comment from the "shareholder/investor" constit-
uency.12 1 The Commission's descriptions of the comments do
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/about/pap/process-and-players4.html (last visited
Oct. 18, 2005).
114. The Business Test Panel was originally established as a pilot project in 1998.
See DG Internal Mkt. & Servs., European Commission, Evaluation of the European Business
Test Panel (2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/internal-market/evalu-
ation/2002-ebtpen.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005); see also McCreevy, supra note 112,
at 3 ("We have also developed interactive tools such as the European Business Test
Panel. It allows us to consult directly more than 3,000 businesses across the EU.").
115. See supra note 55.
116. See Council Directive No. 2004/39, art. 1, O.J. L 145/1 (2004).
117. Council Directive No. 1993/22, O.J. L 141 (1993).
118. See European Commission, Upgrading the Investment Services Directive, at 23-24,
COM (2000) 729 final (Nov. 15, 2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/
com/pdf/2000/com2000_0729en01 .pdf.
119. See DG INTERNAL MKT. & SERVS., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SYNTHESIS OF RE-
SPONSES TO COMM (2000) 729 (July 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internalmarket/securities/docs/isd/2001-07-summ-responses.pdf.
120. See Revision of the Investment Services Directive: Second Consultation Overview Paper,
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/securities/isd/revisionen.
htm#doc (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
121. See REVISION OF THE INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE (93/22), SUMMARY OF RE-
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not identify commentators by name and do not generally iden-
tify particular comments with particular categories of respon-
dent.12 2 A second consultation took place in 2002,123 and a pro
posed directive was published in November 2002.124 Soon after
the MiFID was adopted in 2004, the Commission asked the Com-
mittee of European Securities Regulators ("CESR") to provide
advice on possible implementing measures. 125 The Commission
does not necessarily follow all of CESR's recommendations in
making proposals for measures to implement the level one direc-
tives. 126
Unlike the Basel Committee, IOSCO and the IAIS, the EU's
CESR 1 27 operates in the context of a legal framework where par-
ticipants have developed expectations about consultation.
128
122. See id.
123. By the time the second consultation was announced the Commission said it
had received 77 responses to the July 2001 consultation. See DG INTERNAL MKT. &
SERVS., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REVISION OF INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE, SECOND
CONSULTATION, OVERVIEW PAPER, at 2, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemal
_market/securities/docs/isd/2nd-overview-paper en.pdf.
124. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Invest-
ment Services and Regulated Markets, and Amending Council Directive 85/611/EEC, Council
Directive 93/6/EEC and European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/12/EC, at 7, COM
(2002) 625 final (Nov. 19, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/
pdf/2002/com2002_0625en01.pdf(last visited Oct. 18, 2005) ("The present proposal
has been drafted on the basis of a careful consideration of the 107 responses to these
revised orientations.").
125. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FORMAL REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL ADVICE ON POSSI-
BLE IMPLEMENTING MEASURES ON THE DIRECTIVE ON MARKETS IN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
(DIRECTIVE 2004/39/EC) (June 25, 2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/in-
ternalmarket/securities/docs/cesr/final-mandate-isd en.pdf. This formal request was
preceded by a provisional mandate in January 2004.
126. See, e.g., European Commission, Explanatory Note: Main Differences Between
Working Document ESC/1 7/2005 and the CESR Level 2 Advice (Working Document ESC/
18/2005, May 13, 2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarket/se-
curities/docs/isd/dir-2004-39-implement/esc-1 7-2005-explanatory-en.pdf.
127. CESR, the Committee of European Securities Regulators, was established by
Commission Decision No. 2001/527 of June 6, 2001 Establishing the Committee of
European Securities Regulators. See O.J. L 191/43 (2001). CESR is intended to "serve
as an independent body for reflection, debate and advice for the Commission in the
securities field." Id. at Recital No. 8. It also has a role in encouraging implementation
of EU securities measures. See id. at Recital No. 9. CESR is composed of representatives
of securities regulators from the Member States. Id. at Recital No. 6.
128. See, e.g., Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dialogue, supra note 47,
at 5:
By fulfilling its duty to consult, the Commission ensures that its proposals are
technically viable, practically workable and based on a bottom-up approach.
In other words, good consultation serves a dual purpose by helping to improve
the quality of the policy outcome and at the same time enhancing the involve-
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CESR's Charter states that:
The Committee will use the appropriate processes to consult
(both ex-ante and ex-post) market participants, consumers
and end users which may include inter alia: concept releases,
consultative papers, public hearings and roundtables, written
and Internet consultations, public disclosure and summary of
comments, national and/or European focused consultations.
The Committee will make a public statement of its consulta-
tion practices.'
29
The Charter also states that "[f] or the purpose of facilitating the
dialogue with market participants, consumers and other end
users of financial services, the Committee will establish working
consultative groups, whenever appropriate. 1 0  Rather than
merely inviting comments on its proposals, CESR involves mar-
ket participants in its formal processes through a committee of
market representatives.'3 1 In addition, CESR has established a
number of Expert Groups on the various issues it is responsible
for.'3 2 There are three Expert Groups for the MiFID, which fo-
cus on market transparency, intermediaries and co-operation
and enforcement.13 CESR has not as yet established a commit-
tee of consumer representatives, although in May 2005 CESR
held a "Consumer Day" on the MiFID and acknowledged the
need to interact with consumer groups in the future:
The importance CESR attaches to receiving comments on its
advice from representatives of retail clients and consumers
was stressed and CESR expressed its concern that the re-
sponses received to previous consultations carried out on
ment of interested parties and the public at large. A further advantage is that
transparent and coherent consultation processes run by the Commission not
only allow the general public to be more involved, they also give the legislature
greater scope for scrutinizing the Commission's activities (e.g., by making
available documents summarizing the outcome of the consultation process).
Id.
129. CHARTER OF THE COMM. OF EUROPEAN SEC. REGULATORS, art. 5.10, available at
http://www.cmvm.pt/cooperacao-internacional/docsscesr/cartaRESCO.pdf.
130. Id. art. 5.11.
131. CESR has a Market Participants Consultative Panel. See CESR, How it Works,
www.cesr-eu.org/contenu-howitworks.php. Similarly, the Committee of European
Banking Supervisors ("CEBS") has established a Consultative Panel of representatives of
market participants to act as a sounding board. See CEBS, Consultative Panel, http://
www.c-ebs.org/consultativepanel.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
132. See generally CESR, How it Works, supra note 131.
133. See CESR, Expert Groups, Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
[MiFID], http://www.cesr-eu.org (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
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MiFID, had not reflected sufficiently this set of stakeholders.
CESR made it known that it intended to organise similar
meetings in the future to continue and develop this dialogue
further.' 3
4
The consumer groups that attended this meeting pointed
out that they did not necessarily have the resources in terms of
knowledge and staff to be able to prepare "considered re-
sponses" to consultations.13 5 They also suggested that it would
be helpful if consultation papers were more "reader-friendly"
and if they were translated from English into the different na-
tional languages." 6 English is the dominant language in the in-
ternational financial markets," 7 but financial regulation does
not only affect professional market participants. Publishing con-
sultation papers only in English tends to favor people in the
United Kingdom, and members of the elite who either read En-
glish or can afford to pay for translators.1 3 ' That CESR operates
in English is particularly unusual in the context of the EU, which
from the very early days was committed to the principle that citi-
zens should be able to communicate with the institutions in their
own language. 39
134. CESR, MiFID CONSUMER DAY-22 MARCH 2005. ISSUES ON REGULATION OF
IN'TERMEDIARIES AND MARKETS UNDER MIFID-"SUMMARY OF THE MAIN CONCLUSIONS," 1




137. The prospectus directive's reference to a "language customary in the sphere
of international finance" is generally understood at least to include English. Council
Directive No. 2003/71, O.J. L 345/64 (2003) (amending Directive No. 2001/34, O.J. L
345/64 (2001), art. 19(2) (Dec. 31, 2003)), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/
pri/en/oj/dat/2003/_345/_34520031231enOO640089.pdf.
138. The EU currently comprises twenty-five Member States with over twenty offi-
cial languages. The United Kingdom is the only country where English is the official
language. See Europa, Languages of the European Union, http://europa.eu.int/
comm/education/policies/lang/languages/index-en.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2005)
(note that Irish is scheduled to become the twenty-first official language of the Euro-
pean Union starting January 1, 2007).
139. See DIRECTORATE-GEN'L FOR TRANSLATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
TRANSLATING FOR A MULTI-LINGUAL COMMUNITY 3 (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.
europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/ translation/bookshelf/brochureen.pdf ("The European
Union institutions have to be as accessible and open as possible to the general public as
well as to the government departments and official and unofficial interest groups of all
kinds. The Commission sees it as its duty to foster a democratic entity in which individ-
ual, local, regional and national characteristics are respected and safeguarded."). See
also id. (noting that, under Regulation No. 1, all EU residents have the right to commu-
nicate with the institutions in their own language). This language policy has been sub-
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CESR publishes comments on its proposals on its website."4 °
Financial firms and their trade associations are active com-
menters on CESR's proposals.14" ' Trade associations may file
joint comments on CESR proposals, 42 and they may refer to
each other's comments in their own responses. 143 Consumers
and consumer organizations do not have the resources of time
or expertise to participate as effectively in consultations.' 44
Europeans have expressed concern about a lack of transparency
in the EU's governance,145 and Siim Kallas, the Commissioner
for Administrative Affairs, Audit and Anti-Fraud announced an
EU Transparency Initiative in March 2005, although the prom-
ised White Paper has not yet been published.' 46
The financial firms and trade associations that comment on
CESR's proposals are not limited to firms and trade associations
from the EU Member States. Rather, multinational firms and
trade associations that represent such firms also comment on
CESR's proposals reflecting the international characteristics of
financial activity.' 4 7 For example, when CESR issued its State-
ment on Consultation Practices in 2001, the Securities Industry
Association commented that it was "supportive of CESR's pro-
ject to stress as a result of enlargement. See id. ("In the interests of cost-effectiveness, the
Commission conducts its internal business in English, French and German, going fully
multilingual only when it communicates with the other EU institutions, the Member
States and the public.").
140. See generally http://www.cesr-eu.org.
141. See id.
142. See, e.g., ISMA ET AL., RESPONSE TO CESR's CONSULTATION ON ITS OCTOBER
2004 PRELIMINARY PROGRESS REPORT "WHICH SUPERVISORY TOOLS FOR THE EU SECURITIES
MARKETS?"-THE "HIMALAYA" REPORT (Jan. 25, 2005), available at http://www.bondmar-
kets.com/assets/files/CESRHimalayaresponsefinal.pdf.
143. See, e.g., id. at 3 ("We have seen, and support, ISDA's response to the consulta-
tion.").
144. See, e.g., CESR, MiFID CONSUMER DAY, supra note 134, at 1.
145. See, e.g., Corp. Europe Observatory, Ending Corporate Privileges and Secrecy
Around Lobbying in the European Union (June 2, 2005), available at http://www.
corporateeurope.org/docs/alter-eu.pdf.
146. See Siim Kallas, Vice-President of the European Commission and Comm'r for
Admin. Affairs, Audit and Anti-Fraud, The Need For a European Transparency Initia-
tive, Speech at the European Foundation for Management, Nottingham Business
School, Nottingham (U.K.) (Mar. 3, 2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/130&for-
mat=HTML&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Dec. 14, 2005).
147. See, e.g., Letter from Marc Lackritz, President, Sec. Industry Assoc., to Arthur
Docters van Leeuwen, Chairman, CESR, Re: CESR Draft Statement on Consultation
Practices (Nov. 19, 2001), available at http://www.sia.com/2001_comment-letters/pdf/
CESR.pdf.
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posed 'Consultation Practices' as an excellent first step towards
implementing a fully effective consultation process ...such a
process best serves all market participants, and is the foundation
for deep, liquid and efficient markets."148 The SIA urged CESR
to consult not just at the EU level but also at the international
level.14 Financial trade associations based in the United States
seek to inform their members about developments outside the
country. 50 The Bond Market Association's News Bulletins regu-
larly inform Association members about regulatory initiatives in
the EU as well as in the United States.15' In April 2005, the
Bond Market Association, the IPMA and the ISMA announced
that they would integrate their European activities in the Inter-
national Capital Market Association ("ICMA") in order "to en-
sure consistent and coordinated global representation of the
capital markets and to fully leverage the respective associations'
resources and expertise in support of their members."'' 52
The increasing amount of international harmonization of
standards for the financial markets is in part a response to con-
cerns about how divergent approaches to regulation may inter-
fere with cross-border financial activity. However, harmoniza-
tion occurs in different fora, in regional organizations and in
international organizations. 153 International banking organiza-
tions need to focus not only on the Basel committee's work on
capital adequacy, but on the EU's implementation of the Basel
standards-in addition to domestic implementation in the dif-
ferent jurisdictions where they are licensed. Some lobbying en-
ergy is focused on persuading harmonizers to use the same ap-
148. Id. at 1.
149. See id. at 3.
150. See, e.g., Bond Mkt. News Bulletin (Mar. 2, 2005), available at http://www.
bondmarket.com/newsletters/2005/20050302.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
151. See id.
152. Joint Press Release, Bond Mkt. Ass'n [BMA], Int'l Sec. Mkt. Ass'n [ISMA] and
Int'l Primary Mkt. Ass'n [IPMA], European Capital Markets Trade Associations Global
Partnership to be Established (Apr. 20, 2005), available at http://www.ipma.org.uk/
pdfs/200405%20PRESS%20RELEASE%20WITH%20BMA.PDF. This announcement
followed an announcement in February 2005 that the IPMA and the ISMA would
merge. SeeJoint Press Release, IPMA & ISMA, IPMA and ISMA Announce Merger (Feb.
3, 2005), available at http://www.ipma.org.uk/pdfs/PRESS%20%20RELEASE%20FI-
NAL%20030205.PDF.
153. See generally Aid Harmonization & Alignment, Rome Declaration on Harmoniza-
tion, http://www.aidharmonization.org/ah-overview/secondary-pages/why-RomeDecla-
ration (last visited Oct. 18, 2005) (noting the importance of harmonization at both
regional and international levels).
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proaches to particular issues that have been adopted else-
where. 15 4 For example, in commenting on CESR proposals, the
SIA has urged CESR to copy the approach of U.S. regulators. 155
In the context of the EU, some commentators have sug-
gested that market participants like a situation where rule-mak-
ing is centralized so that they can focus their lobbying efforts.156
Thus, financial firms might prefer not to have to deal with CESR
as well as with the Commission.
Transnational standard-setting creates needs for new trade
associations, or at least new jobs in existing trade associations.
Trade associations need to coordinate their actions with trade
associations established in other jurisdictions for maximum im-
pact.157 Large multinational, multi-function financial firms will
belong to a number of different trade associations, and may well
make their own separate submissions as part of consultation ex-
154. See Letter from SIA to jean-Michel Godeffroy, Dir. General, Eur. Cent. Bank,
Re: Comments on the Draft ESCB-CESR Standards for Securities Clearing and Settle-
ment Systems in the European Union of May 2004, at 3 (Aug. 3, 2004), available at
http://www.sia.com/2004_commentletters/2837.pdf.
155. See id. The SIA commented that:
In marked contrast to reactions of the banking community in Europe to the
ESCB-CESR Standards, U.S. banking institutions were broadly supportive of
the Interagency White Paper recommendations. The reasons for this are
clear. In their approach, U.S. regulators did not attempt to impose additional
regulations on firms considered to play significant roles in critical markets.
Rather, they tried to ensure the promulgation of best practices, used market-
led initiatives to ensure a robust communications infrastructure, and fostered
competition as a means to reduce concentration of risks. We believe a combi-
nation of these approaches in Europe would not only fulfill the objective of
risk reduction, but also benefit market participants by avoiding the cost of
excessive regulation, preserving choice, and encouraging innovation.
Id.
156. See, e.g., CTR. FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES [CEPS], PROSPECTUS FOR CEPS
TASK FORCE ON EU FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION BEYOND 2005, AN AGENDA
FOR THE NEW COMMISSION 2 (2004) [hereinafter CEPS PROSPECTUS], available at http://
cepsOl.link.be/files/ProspectusBeyond2005.pdf ("[W]hile market practitioners often
preach the virtues of delegation, most appear more comfortable of their capacity to
ensure suitable outcomes if legislative power is kept at level 1. In short, while there is a
general agreement that delegation is important, all have significant interests in keeping
detailed rule-making power at the centre.").
157. See, e.g., Helen Banks, It's Only Just Begun ... APCIMS REv., Spring 2005, at
13, available at http://www.apcims.org/public/publications/qreview/Spring%202005.
pdf (noting that the Association of Private Client Investment Managers and Stockbro-
kers ("APCIMS") "continues to work in cooperation with trade associations represent-
ing investment firms within ten European countries, to try and improve the position for
this sector").
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ercises. 15  Smaller firms with fewer human and financial capital
resources have a quieter voice in the consultation process. 1
59
But consumer groups are noticeably absent from many of the
discussions about financial regulation, distanced from the discus-
sions by lack of resources and by lack of "expertise."160
The practice of consultation and response in the context of
supranational financial standard-setting and rule-making con-
trasts dramatically with ideals of bottom-up governance. Consul-
tation processes that tend to exclude smaller firms and consum-
ers are less legitimate than those that are more inclusive.' 6 ' As
well as being less legitimate, such exclusive processes may pro-
duce different results than more inclusive processes. 6 2 Finan-
cial firms and their trade associations tend to argue against rules
and for non-legislative measures, 63 they will argue for certainty
for themselves (sometimes this will mean less certainty for
others), and they will argue about the costs of regulation and the
benefits of deregulation.' 6 4
158. See, e.g., Futures Indus. Ass'n, Member Firms, http://www.futuresindustry.
org/memberfi-2147.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2005) (listing Goldman Sachs & Co. as a
member firm); Int'l Sec. Ass'n for Institutional Trade Commc'n-Int'l Operations
Ass'n, http://www.isitc.org/industry-forums/members.cfm?groupld=5 (last visited
Sept. 25, 2005) (listing Goldman Sachs & Co. as an ISAITC member firm).
159. See, e.g., CEPS PROSPECTUS, supra note 156. at 3 ("The extended comitology
process and the accompanying consultations place much demand on both market par-
ticipants and member state authorities in terms of manpower and time. As this is costly,
are larger institutions better placed to exercise influence? How can the influence of
smaller institutions be ensured?").
160. See id. ("Some interests are better organised than others. It is often noted
that consumer associations are less present in the consultations and regulatory game




163. See, e.g., ISMA ET AL., PUBLIC COMMENTS ON IOSCO's CONSULTATION REPORT
ON CODE OF CONDUCT FUNDAMENTALS FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 2 (Nov. 2004), avail-
able at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD177_25.pdf ("One of the
foundation stones of our discussions with legislators and regulators and in our re-
sponses to various legislative and regulatory initiatives in recent years has been our
strong advocacy of the use of non-legislative measures unless there is evidence of a
market failure which industry participants are unable or unwilling to correct.").
164. See, e.g., ISMA ET AL., supra note 142, at 4 ("It is important to recognise that
supervisors must be accountable to national authorities who work within the interna-
tional legal framework that is set up in a process of full democratic accountability.
Equally it is essential to recognise that it would not be practical or desirable to submit
every individual supervisory action to democratic scrutiny and legislative control. This
would also not be consistent with any drive towards deregulation.").
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B. Domestic Rule-Making
Domestic financial regulators sit, sometimes uncomfortably,
between the supranational bodies that produce international
standards and regulated firms.1 65 This may lead them to publish
documents explaining their role in these international net-
works.'6 6 When domestic regulators work together in networks,
such as the Basel Committee, they may seek comments at home
on proposals for harmonization as they would on purely domes-
tic initiatives.16 Thus, domestic consultation procedures, involv-
ing market participants may influence supranational regulatory
initiatives.168 At other times, domestic regulators seek comments
on their proposed implementations of supranational harmo-
nized rules.16 But, as the International Bar Association has
pointed out, supranational standards may not benefit from as
much discussion and consultation at the domestic level as pro-
posed standards which originate domestically:
It seems increasingly clear that the essential discussion of
standards will take place at the IOSCO level rather than later
at the home country level and that home country regulators
will increasingly take the position that the standards adopted
by IOSCO foreclose further discussion in the home country
of the topics covered by these standards. This process is legiti-
mate in democratic rulemaking when, and only when, those
same principles have been fully vetted in a public manner at
165. See, e.g., FSA, Who Are We, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/about/who/in-
dex.shtml (last visited Sept. 25, 2005) (explaining how the FSA regulates firms); see also
FSA, International and EU, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/About/what/international/
index.shtml (last visited Sept. 25, 2005) (explaining how the FSA coordinates with the
European Union).
166. See, e.g., FSA, INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY OUTLOOK 2005,JUNE UPDATE (June
2005), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/plan/iro-2005/iro_2005-update.pdf.
167. See, e.g. ,Joint Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Banking Agencies
Announce Publication of Basel Accord Consultative Paper (Apr. 30, 2003), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2003/20030430 (last visited
Oct. 18, 2005).
168. Participation in supranational processes may also affect domestic regulators'
actions at home. Cf Stephen Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The Prospects
and Limits of New Approaches to Transatlantic Governance Through Mutual Recognition and
Safe Harbor Agreements, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29, 71 (2002) ("A central normative goal of
transgovernmental regulatory cooperative efforts is to create frameworks that conduce
national regulators to reflexively take into account the impact of their actions on af-
fected, but otherwise unrepresented, foreign constituents, while remaining deferential
to distinct national values and priorities.").
169. See generally, e.g., FSA, The Listing Review, supra note 56.
20051
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an international level. 1
70
Domestic consultations may generate responses from a
wider range of participants than consultations by supranational
standard-setters.1 7' In part, this is because consultation proce-
dures at the domestic level may be more inclusive than consulta-
tion procedures at the supranational level.1 72 The U.K.'s Finan-
cial Services Authority has a Consumer Panel 73 and a Small Bus-
iness Panel as well as a Practitioner Panel. 74 These structures
contrast with CESR's emphasis on ensuring only the participa-
tion of market participants, and not the participation of consum-
ers of financial services, in its processes.175 The consumers' in-
terests are not ignored in the context of CESR's actions.1 76 For
example, the Financial Services Authority says that it takes ac-
count of the interests of consumers, particularly when it imple-
ments international standards. 77 If, however, CESR itself does
not take active steps to encourage consumer participation, the
consumers' voices are muted compared to business voices and
actions by domestic regulators in the process of implementing
supranational rules may not be adequate amplifiers of the si-
lenced consumer voices.
Transnational financial activity increases the incentives for
foreign firms to try to influence domestic rulemaking through
campaign contributions 178 and commenting on proposed do-
170. IOSCO PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 29, at 18 (Comments of the Interna-
tional Bar Association).
171. Consumer groups could perhaps be more effective lobbyists in the context of
domestic regulatory initiatives than they are. SeeJulie L. Williams, Acting Comptroller
of the Currency, Remarks Before Women in Housing and Finance and The Exchequer
Club, at 7 (Jan. 12, 2005), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2005-
la.pdf ("[W]hat seems to be absent in the dialogue with consumer organizations is a
discussion of the interplay of how to better inform consumers by disclosing better, but
not necessarily more, information, and the impact of regulatory disclosure burdens on
banking institutions. And why aren't consumer organizations berating us to do con-
sumer testing to find out what consumers really want and think is important?").
172. See id.
173. See Fin. Servs. Consumer Panel, About the Panel, http://www.fs-cp.org.uk/ct_
about panel.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
174. See Fin. Servs. Practitioner Panel website, http://www.fs pp.org.uk (last visited
Oct. 18, 2005).
175. See generally CESR, Mkt. Participants Consultative Panel, http://www.cesr-
eu.org (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
176. See, e.g., FSA, supra note 166, at 11.
177. See id.
178. A number of political action committees ("PACs") operating in the United
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mestic regulations." 9 For example, in 2002, the U.S. Congress
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which applies to foreign firms
whose securities are traded in the U.S. markets.' The statute
would have required some foreign companies to have audit com-
mittees composed of independent directors, conflicting with re-
quirements in their home jurisdictions.' 8 ' After receiving more
than 185 comments on the audit committee independence pro-
posal, the SEC adopted final rules which sought to accommo-
date the difficulties of foreign issuers.18 2  The SEC has also
adopted regulations specifying that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's
prohibition on loans to directors, which under the provisions of
the statute were specified not to apply to insured depositary insti-
tutions in the United States (a term which could not apply to a
foreign bank), would not apply to foreign banks. ' The SEC
has shown itself to be much more willing to work with regulators
from other jurisdictions than the U.S. Congress, and than the
SEC was itself only a few years earlier." 4 As commentators no-
ticed that regulations make it easier for U.S. issuers than for for-
eign issuers to avoid the application of Sarbanes-Oxley regula-
tions by deregistering their securities, SEC officials suggested
that the SEC would make it easier for foreign issuers to dere-
gister their securities in the United States.'1 5
States have foreign connections. For example, the Credit Suisse First Boston PAC gave
US$377,250 to candidates for the U.S. Congress and Senate in the 2004 election cycle.
See OpenSecrets.org, Credit Suisse First Boston-2004 PAC Summary Data, http://
www.opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.asp?strlD=C001 11 559&cycle=2004 (last visited Oct.
18, 2005).
179. See, e.g., Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed.
Reg. 18,788, 18,802 (Apr. 16, 2003) [hereinafter SEC Committee Standards] (noting
that several foreign issuers had expressed concerns about the possible application of
Exchange Act section 10A(m)).
180. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
181. See SEC Committee Standards, supra note 179, at 18,797.
182. See generally id. The EU-U.S. financial markets dialogue is an attempt to re-
solve issues like this for the future.
183. See Foreign Bank Exemption from the Insider Lending Prohibition of Ex-
change Act Section 13(k), Exchange Act Release No. 49,616, 69 Fed. Reg. 24,016 (Apr.
30, 2004).
184. Commentators have sometimes suggested that the United States "views free
trade in securities as everybody else abiding by American rules." Barbara Stymiest, To-
wards The Development of Integrated Global Markets: Is Mutual Recognition The Way
Forward?, Speech to the FESE Convention (June 12, 2003), available at http://www.
fese.be/efmc/2003/report/efmcstymiest.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
185. See, e.g., SEC Staff Likely to Recommend Rule To Ease Deregistrationfor Foreign Firms,
36 SEC. REc. & L. REP. (BNA) 2050 (Nov. 22, 2004). U.S. issuers can deregister if there
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The enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its aftermath
illustrate that domestic legislatures may be insensitive to the im-
pact of domestic rules on multinational businesses. Whereas the
U.S. Congress enacted a statute that imposed significant burdens
on foreign firms, the SEC has been responsive when these firms
have raised their concerns. The Transatlantic Business Dialogue
has suggested that legislators from the U.S. Congress and the
European Parliament should develop a dialogue to avoid such
problems for the future.' 8 6
Even where domestic rule-making proposals seem to affect
domestic rather than cross-border interests, firms and their trade
associations may argue that the proposals threaten domestic fi-
nancial markets, with the explicit or implicit suggestion that they
might lose business overseas.
18 7
II. CONTRACTING
Transnational financial activity is accomplished through
contracts. Contracts are the core mechanism whereby the mar-
ket regulates itself.88 The relationship between contracts and
are fewer than 300 "holders of record of their securities" whereas foreign issuers can
only deregister if they have fewer than 300 beneficial owners in the United States. Id.
186. See TRANSATLANTIC BUSINEss DIALOGUE REPORT, supra note 24, at 20.
187. Cf Letter from the Bond Mkt. Assoc. to Eric Solomon, Deputy Ass't for Regu-
latory Affairs, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, and Donald L. Colb, Chief Counsel, IRS, Cir-
cular 230-mpact of Section 10.35 on the U.S. Capital Markets (June 17, 2005), available at
http://www.bondmarkets.com/assets/files/Circular-230_CommentLetter.pdf. The
Bond Market Association commented that:
The U.S. capital markets are recognized as the most efficient and liquid capi-
tal markets in the world. These attributes derive, in part, from the established
practices and expectations of the participants in these markets and also from
the ability of federal securities regulators to adapt the regulatory structure as
needed to keep pace with the evolution of capital markets practices. Issuers
and investors view our capital markets as appropriately balancing the compet-
ing interests of providing ready access to the markets while at the same time
affording investors with appropriate protections for their investments.
Id.
Arguments about the impact of regulation on competition are a feature of lobbying in
the EU. See, e.g., APCIMS, "Group of Eleven" Seek Urgent Changes to New Capital Require-
ments Directive (Apr. 18, 2005), available at http://www.apcims.org/public/news/re-
leases/2005/Changes%20to%20new%20Capital%20Requirements.asp (last visited Oct.
18, 2005) (quoting Angela Knight, APCIMS' Chief Executive, as saying: "When eleven
European trade associations work together to lobby the EU Commission, you know
something is fundamentally wrong!").
188. In this section of the Article I contrast "regulation" and "contract," but I also
want to suggest that contracts control behavior in ways that are similar to regulation. Cf
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(public) financial regulation in the international financial mar-
kets is complex and multi-faceted. Contracts involve risks that
regulators need to address as part of evaluating risks that may
damage financial stability. t8 9 At the same time contracts may be
used to limit or shift risks away from financial institutions. Regu-
lations may specify the contents of contracts or may preclude the
inclusion of certain provisions in contracts. °90 This section ad-
dresses four themes in this complex relationship between regula-
tion and contracts: Contracts are preferable to regulation; con-
tracts function as regulation; contracts constrain regulation; and
regulation constrains contracts.
A. Contracts Are Preferable To Regulation
Consistent with preferences for no regulation or for deregu-
lation,' financial market participants will often argue that con-
tracts can be used more effectively or as effectively to achieve
objectives for which regulatory solutions are proposed. 192 The
Alan Greenspan, Government Regulation and Derivative Contracts, Remarks at the Fi-
nancial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Coral Gables, Flor-
ida (Feb. 21, 1997), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/
1997/19970221.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). Mr. Greenspan noted that:
[N]o market is ever truly unregulated. The self-interest of market participants
generates private market regulation. Thus, the real question is not whether a
market should be regulated. Rather, the real question is whether government
intervention strengthens or weakens private regulation. If incentives for pri-
vate market regulation are weak or if market participants lack the capabilities
to pursue their interests effectively, then the introduction of government regu-
lation may improve regulation. But if private market regulation is effective,
then government regulation is at best unnecessary.
Id.
189. See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE JOINT FORUM, CREDIT
RISK TRANSFER (Mar. 2005) [hereinafter CREDIT RISK TRANSFER], available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/j ointl 3.pdf.
190. Cf OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR INSURERS' GOVERNANCE, supra note 39, at
14 ("[R]egulatory authorities must be cautious not to impose highly restrictive rules
and wide-ranging prohibitions that severely restrict the discretionary powers of corpo-
rate executives.").
191. This is only one of the preferences that financial firms articulate, and, in fact,
rational firms would tend to prefer deregulation where rules interfere with their busi-
ness and regulation where rules would interfere with the business of their actual or
potential competitors. Cf Stigler, supra note 15, at 5 ("We propose the general hypothe-
sis: every industry or occupation that has enough political power to utilize the state will
seek to control entry."). A firm's or trade group's preference for competition-reducing
rules may not be articulated as such but rather as a preference for consumer protection
or market integrity.
192. In some domestic jurisdictions, such as the United States, bankruptcy solu-
160 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:127
Euromarkets are often described as markets which came into ex-
istence offshore, avoiding the impact of regulations which ap-
plied to domestic markets. 193 In the early days, relationships in
the Euromarkets were governed by contract rather than by regu-
lation. 94 Not only did market participants in the Euromarkets
avoid domestic regulatory authorities, they also avoided
courts.1 95  Increasingly over time, participants in the
Euromarkets have needed to worry about the impact-and po-
tential impact-of regulation on their activities. 96 Euromarket
participants also now take their disputes to court. 19 7 A market
that seemed twenty-five years ago to be essentially regulated by
non-legal norms is increasingly regulated through legal rules.
Still, Euromarket participants work to carve out spaces for con-
tract rather than regulation.
Market participants have argued for contracts rather than
regulation in the context of sovereign debt. When officials at
the IMF proposed to resolve problems associated with sovereign
debtors defaulting on their debt through the introduction of a
supranational equivalent to domestic bankruptcy proceedings,19 8
many commentators and market participants argued that a con-
tions are often negotiated solutions ("pre-packaged bankruptcies"). See, e.g., Gordon
Bermant & Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: Outcomes of Chapter 11 Cases: U.S. Trustee
Database Sheds New Light on Old Questions, Am. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 1998, at 8, 32 n.8
(noting the prevalence of pre-negotiated, pre-packaged bankruptcies in Delaware). A
sovereign bankruptcy regime need not, therefore, be a "regulatory" regime rather than
a contractual regime. Opposition to the IMF SDRM proposals may suggest more about
market participants' nervousness about the IMF's likely approach to a sovereign bank-
ruptcy regime than about the idea of a sovereign bankruptcy regime as such.
193. See, e.g., PETER KRJGS mAN, A BRIEF HISTORY: IPMA's ROLE IN HARMONISING
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS 1984-1994 (1994), available at http://wvw.ipma.org.
uk/pdfs/History%20of%2OlPMA.PDF ("Originating as an offshore market, and not
subject to the exclusive regulation of one government or group of governments, Euro-




196. See, e.g., Michael Evans, Exchanges Prepare to Deregulate to Protect Eurobond Busi-
ness, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Apr. 2005, at 10.
197. See, e.g., Concord Trust v. Law Debenture Trust Corp., [2005] UKHL 27,
available at http:// www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld2O405/ldjudgmt/
jd050428/concor-l.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2005).
198. See IMF, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Preliminary Considera-
tions (Nov. 30, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/
112702.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005); see also IMF, The Design of the Sovereign Debt Re-
structuring Mechanism-Further Considerations (Nov. 27, 2002), available at http://www.
imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/112702.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
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tractual solution would be preferable to this type of regulatory
solution. Commentators argued that collective action clauses in
bond documentation could solve the problem of holdout credi-
tors in sovereign debt issues where the debtor is unable to meet
all of its commitments.199 Collective action clauses bind credi-
tors to a restructuring agreed to by a specified percentage of
creditors.200 Without such clauses, holdout creditors may refuse
to accept the terms of a restructuring and demand payment in
full of money owing to them.2 ' Although bonds governed by
New York law had not traditionally contained collective action
202clauses, more recent bond documentation for bonds issued by
sovereigns subject to New York law has tended to include collec-
tive action clauses. 20 3  However, although collective action
199. See, e.g., Adam Lerrick & Allan H. Meltzer, Sovereign Default, The Private Sector
Can Resolve Bankruptcy Without a Formal Court, CARNEGIE MELLON Q. INT'L ECON. REP.
(Apr. 2002), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/bank.pdf; REPORT OF THE C-10
WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES (Sept. 26, 2002) [hereinafter REPORT OF
THE G-10 WORKING GROUP], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf.
200. See, e.g., Anne Krueger, IMF First Deputy Managing Dir., Sovereign Debt Re-
structuring: Messy or Messier?, Speech to the Annual Meeting of the American Eco-
nomic Association Washington D.C. (Jan. 4, 2003), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/np/speeches/2003/010403.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). A report of the
C-10 Working Group stated that:
The view of the Working Group is that this clause is perhaps the most critical
component of the package that is being proposed, because it provides flexibil-
ity in reaching agreement on the terms of a restructuring that debtors and
creditors find to be in their collective interest. At the same time, use of this
clause could ensure that the rights of the supermajority are respected and
prevent a small minority of dissident creditors from pursuing disruptive litiga-
tion.
REPORT OF THE G-10 WORKING GROUP, supra note 199, at 3.
201. Vulture funds may also buy distressed debt with a view to pursuing such
claims. See, e.g., Elliott Assocs. v. Banco De La Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 372 (2d Cir. 1999)
(interpreting New York law to hold that "the acquisition of a debt with intent to bring
suit against the debtor is not a violation ... where ... the primary purpose of the suit is
the collection of the debt acquired"); Elliott Assocs. v. Republic of Panama, 975 F.
Supp. 332, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Although one could reasonably quarrel with the seem-
liness of ... such 'vulture fund' tactics as investing in distressed companies or loans,...
the purchase of a loan in the circumstances of this case surely does not rise to the level
of criminal conduct.").
202. See, e.g., John Drage & Catherine Hovaguimian, Collective Action Clauses
(CACS): An Analysis of Provisions Included in Recent Sovereign Bond Issues (Summary), FIN.
STAsILiTy REV., Dec. 2004, 105, 105 ("While CACs have been common in several juris-
dictions where sovereign bonds are issued (England, Luxembourg and Japan), they
were uncommon in sovereign bonds issued under New York law"), available at http://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2004/fsrl 7art7.pdf.
203. See, e.g., id. ("[T]he majority of foreign currency sovereign bonds issued in
New York . . . now contain CACs").
162 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:127
clauses now seem to be standard in sovereign bond issues, bond-
holder voting thresholds vary. 2 °4
As part of the strategy of arguing against the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism ("SDRM") and for collective action
clauses, a group of financial trade associations, which has been
called the "gang of six,"'20 5 worked together to develop "a mar-
ket-oriented process toward sovereign debt restructuring based
on contractual arrangements. ' 20 6 A participant in this process
commented on "the breadth of the private sector groups that
have come together to form this consensus. '20 7 The gang of six
developed standard form collective action clauses for inclusion
in sovereign bond documentation.20 8
A contractual solution to the problem of holdout creditors
has attractive features: bondholders have notice when they in-
vest that they are buying investments subject to rules which as-
sume collective action in response to issuers' attempts to
reschedule debt, and they are, as a result, bound by these ar-
rangements. Thus, collective action clauses can help to ensure
that no holders of a particular issue of bonds are treated better
than any other holders of that issue. However, contractual ar-
204. See, e.g., Andrew G. Haldane et al., Optimal Collective Action Clause Thresholds
(Bank of England, Working Paper No. 249, 2004), available at http://wxw.bankofen-
gland.co.uk/publications/workingpapers/wp249.pdf.
205. See ROBERT GRAY, CHAIRMAN INT'L PRIMARY MKT. ASS'N, COLLECTIVE ACTION
CLAUSES: THE WAY FORWARD 2-3 (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.law.georgetown.
edu/international/documents/Gray_000.pdf ("The International Primary Market Asso-
ciation (IPMA) together with five other trade associations (the "gang of six") took the
lead in developing marketable CACs suitable for inclusion in bond contracts governed
by both New York and English law."). The "gang of six" was the Bond Market Associa-
tion, the Emerging Markets Creditors Association, EMTA, the International Primary
Market Association, the Institute of International Finance and the Securities Industry
Association.
206. Press Release, Emerging Mkts. Creditors' Ass'n et al., Financial Industry Lead-
ers Announce Consensus on Crisis Management and Sovereign Debt Restructuring,
Market-Based Principles Agreed By Major Global Associations (June 11, 2002), available
at http://www.ipma.org.uk/pdfs/2002,%2011% 20June%20Joint%2OPress%20Release
%20on%20Sovereign%2ODebt%2ORestructuring.PDF.
207. Id. The press release also states that "[o] ther private sector groups such as
the EFFAS-European Bond Commission have also expressed support for the private
sector principles and fully endorse this press release." Id.
208. See EMERGING MKTS. CREDITORS Ass'N [EMCA], MODEL COVENANTS FOR NEW
SOVEREIGN DEBT ISSUES (May 3, 2002), available at http://www.emta.org/ndevelop/
model.pdf; see also EMTA DRAFT DOCUMENTS, http://www.emta.org/ndevelop/Final_
merged.pdf.
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rangements typically bind only parties to the contracts. 2 9 Thus,
collective action clauses in the documentation for individual
bond issues cannot produce a situation in which all creditors of a
particular issuer receive equal treatment.210 Moreover, just as all
contracts operate in a legal context that affects their viability,
collective action clauses operate in the shadow of the IMF's ac-
tions.2 n
Although contracts do not bind non-parties, they can create
positive or negative externalities for such parties.212 A contract
between a trade association and its members may or may not
mandate high standards of behavior that will benefit the mem-
bers' customers. The same contracts may harm potential com-
petitors who are excluded from membership.213
These are some of the reasons for subjecting SROs to statu-
tory controls. But some commentators have pointed out that
209. See e.g., REPORT OF THE C-10 WORKING GROUP, supra note 199, at 5-6.
210. See, e.g., Krueger, supra note 200 ("[E]ach bond issue would constitute a sepa-
rate class and CACs would thus not solve intercreditor equity concerns and collective
action problems across bond issues or between bonds and other creditors (most impor-
tantly banks)."). A report by the G-10 Working group also states that:
The Working Group believes that "aggregation" across a range of different
types of creditors for voting purposes under the majority amendment clause,
while desirable, is not practicable within a contractually based mechanism.
However, it would appear to be legally and contractually possible to have debt
instruments issued pursuant to a single master agreement such as a medium-
term note programme providing for blended voting under certain circum-
stances. This approach has a great deal of potential, especially within the con-
text of bonds issued under the laws of a single jurisdiction, and merits further
exploration, as medium-term note programmes are increasingly used by
emerging market borrowers. It is noted, however, that the Working Group
has not focused on the technicalities of this approach in any detail.
REPORT OF THE G-10 WORKING GROUP, supra note 199, at 5-6.
211. See, e.g., Paul Bedford, Adrian Penalver & Chris Salmon, Resolving Sovereign
Debt Crises: The Market-Based Approach and the Role of the IMF, FIN. STABILITY REv.,June 27,
2005, at 91, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2005/
fsrl8artS.pdf.
212. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of
Servitude Restrictions, 70 IowA L. REv. 615, 617 (1985) (arguing that contracts creating
servitudes may create externalities that affect third parties).
213. See, e.g., COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY
COMM., MKT. ACCESS SUBCOMM., INTERIM REPORT, BEST PRACTICES FOR ORGANIZED ELEC-
TRONIC MARKETS 5 (Nov. 27, 2001), available at http://www.cftc.gov/files/ac/acinterim-
marketaccessreport.pdf ("The continued application of private sector rules, structures
and processing conventions that were developed and presumably justified in an envi-
ronment where market access was not global in scope and achievable at declining costs,
may serve to perpetuate privileged market access by market participants or classes of
market participants.").
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contracts operate across geographic boundaries-and thus juris-
dictional boundaries-in ways that regulation does not.2 14 The
IOSCO SRO Consultative Committee has argued that self-regula-
tion is useful because it can transcend national boundaries in
ways that law and administrative rules cannot.2 15 In 2000, Robert
Glauber of the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD") announced a "new strategic initiative ... to offer...
regulatory services to other exchanges and regulators, again
both here in the U.S. and abroad. '2 16 Ultimately, contracts de-
pend on the possibility of enforcement through State
processes, 2 17 but through contracts, markets may harmonize
faster, and more effectively, than regulation.
Self-regulation through contract may not be as effective in
practice as the IOSCO SRO Consultative Committee and NASD
claim. Despite globalization, States still have at their disposal re-
sources that they can invoke to impede the effectiveness of rules
developed within epistemic communities without the involve-
ment of state authorities.2 1 8 Scandals may prompt legislatures to
enact new tough rules.21 9  Self-regulatory rules may be invali-
dated under competition laws. 2 2 ' The global rules, which as a
214. See, e.g., Norman S. Poser, The Stock Exchanges of the United States and Europe:
Automation, Globalization and Consolidation, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 497, 538 (2001)
("These are not rules promulgated by a government agency, but by contractual arrange-
ments among the participants. This suggests that self-regulation has the ability to fi-
nesse the problems of national sovereignty and differing legal systems that stand in the
way of developing and enforcing common governmental regulatory standards.").
215. See generally MODEL FOR EFFECTIVE REGULATION, supra note 6.
216. Robert R. Glauber, CEO and President, Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers [NASD],
Opening Remarks at NASD Fall Securities Regulation Conference, San Francisco, Cali-
fornia (Nov. 17, 2000), available at http://www.nasdr.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2005); see
also NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS [NASD], NASD INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY SERVICES:
DELIVERING KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE WORLDWIDE (2004), available at http://www.
nasd.com/web/groups/corpcomm/documents/homepage/nasdw_ 013328.pdf.
217. Cf Margaret Jane (Peggy) Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine,
160 J. OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 4 (2004), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=534042 (last visited Oct. 18, 2005) (suggesting ways in which standard-
ized contracts could be generally effective without legal enforcement).
218. See, e.g., Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, supra note 8 (describ-
ing the regulatory context within which SROs operate).
219. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas-The Se-
curities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L.
79, 80 (2005) ("Congress has.., reacted to scandals by giving the SEC greater power.").
220. See, e.g., OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING (U.K.), COMPETITION IN PROFESSIONS (Mar.
2001), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/nr/rdonlyres/b08439c8-c5f6-4946-8aff-71c
050d34f46/0/oft328.pdf (analyzing competition implications of the rules applying to
professions in the U.K). Cf U.S. v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding
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practical matter have some effect across national borders, are
those which either do not, or do not seem to, involve public in-
terest concerns, or which are produced in a manner which en-
tails the consent of at least some States.
B. Contracts Function As Regulation
Contracts regulate the behavior of the contracting par-
ties.22' The extent to which contracts function as the practical
equivalent of regulations varies with the context. Contracts with
larger numbers of parties, or contracts concluded in the same
form with multiple other contracting parties, such as franchise
agreements, tend to have more of a regulatory character than
bilateral contracts.222 SRO rules operate through contract and
are designed to function as regulations of their members' con-
duct.223 Standard form contracts have more of a regulatory char-
acter than individually negotiated agreements.2
24
Financial trade associations have developed standard form
contracts for the international financial markets. 225 They have
done so as part of their mission to help their members, and they
combine efforts to develop standard documentation with the
lobbying efforts described above. 226 Financial trade associations
may describe the purpose of their standard form contracts pro-
grams as being about risk reduction.2 2 7 Alternatively, or as well,
that rules adopted by both Visa and Mastercard that precluded merchants from ac-
cepting competing cards restricted competition and harmed consumers).
221. For example, the literature on private ordering shows that contracts may reg-
ulate behavior effectively even where the contracts are not enforced through courts. See,
e.g., Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive The-
ory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 2328 (2004).
222. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual
Arrangements, 70 Am. ECON. REV. 356, 358-60 (1980) (discussing how franchise contracts
regulate the behavior of franchisees).
223. See, e.g., MODEL FOR EFFECTIVE REGULATION, supra note 6, at 5-6.
224. See, e.g., infra note 235.
225. See, e.g., Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of a Trade Association: Group Interactions
Within the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 HARv. NEG. L. REv. 211, 229
(2001) ("The initial goal-and one of the key accomplishments of ISDA-has been the
development, drafting, and promulgation of standard form documentation for the
OTC derivatives industry.").
226. See id.
227. For example, the ISDA describes its activities as follows:
Since its inception, ISDA has pioneered efforts to identify and reduce the
sources of risk in the derivatives and risk management business. Among its
most notable accomplishments are: developing the ISDA Master Agreement;
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they may say that they are developing standard form documenta-
tion in order to facilitate the development of markets. 228 The
Loan Market Association ("LMA"), which has developed stan-
dard forms for syndicated loan agreements for the London mar-
ket,2 29 was founded in 1996 "as a response to market conditions
and to a perceived willingness on the part of the banking com-
munity to bring greater clarity, efficiency and liquidity to the rel-
atively under-developed secondary market that existed at the
time, and to enable more efficient loan portfolio manage-
ment. '23" The Loan Syndications and Trading Association in the
United States, which has developed Model Credit Agreement
Provisions for U.S. jurisdictions,2 l states that it developed the
model provisions "to promote liquidity and efficiency, increase
legal certainty, reduce transaction costs in connection with origi-
nations activity, and limit legal review for primary and secondary
sales to an 'exceptions' basis, reducing the time and expense of
unnecessary negotiation of boilerplate and other mechanical
publishing a wide range of related documentation materials and instruments
covering a variety of transaction types; producing legal opinions on the en-
forceability of netting and collateral arrangements (available only to ISDA
members); securing recognition of the risk-reducing effects of netting in de-
termining capital requirements; promoting sound risk management practices,
and advancing the understanding and treatment of derivatives and risk man-
agement from public policy and regulatory capital perspectives.
About ISDA, http://www.isda.org/wwa/wwa nav.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
228. Cf Karl Llewellyn, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in English and
Continental Law, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700, 701 (1939) (Book Review) ("The 'general law' is
much too general. It needs tailoring to trades and to lines of trading. Nothing can
approach in speed and sanity of readaptation the machinery of standard forms of a
trade and for a line of trade, built to meet the particular needs of that trade. They save
trouble in bargaining. They save time in bargaining. They infinitely simplify the task of
internal administration of a business unit, of keeping tabs on transactions, of knowing
where one is at, of arranging orderly expectation, orderly fulfillment, orderly planning.
They ease administration by concentrating the need for discretion and decision in such
personnel as can be trusted to be discreet. This reduces human wear and tear, it cheap-
ens administration, it serves the ultimate consumer.").
229. Loan Mkt. Ass'n, Multicurrency Term and Revolving Facilities Agreement in the Rec-
ommended Form of Primary Documents (July 2002) [hereinafter Primary Documents] (paper
on file with author).
230. Loan Mkt. Ass'n, Origins of the LMA, http://www.loan-market-assoc.com/
Public/lma-abou.asp?Display=Origins (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
231. See generally LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING ASS'N (LSTA), MODEL CREDIT
AGREEMENT PROVISIONS [hereinafter LSTA MODEL CREDIT AGREEMENT PROVISIONS] (Jan.




provisions. " 23 2
When trade associations are successful in developing stan-
dard forms that market participants use, the standard forms can
function like regulation in that they set standards for what is nor-
mal behavior in the markets. What is normal may influence a
court's interpretation of contracts, 23 although it may not always
be easy to determine what a standard contractual term actually
means.
234
Normal contractual terms may also influence the behavior
of market participants. It may be difficult for a borrower to ne-
gotiate contractual terms different from those specified in the
standard form syndicated loan agreement.235 The LMA agree-
ment has been designed "to balance the interests of borrowers
and lenders. ' 236  The Association of Corporate Treasurers
("ACT"), which represents borrowers, says:
For many Borrowers, it is likely to be advantageous to use as a
basis for negotiation a format which is becoming increasingly
familiar in the market. It is hoped that this familiarity will
make for greater efficiency in negotiation of the loan docu-
ment and in the syndication process, leading to lower costs
for the Borrower.23 7
The ACT lists some of the potentially unattractive features
of the LMA standard form 2 3 8 and also lists some "key points for
232. Id. at 2.
233. A court may decide whether a contract is ambiguous, for example, by consid-
ering the norms of a particular business context. See, e.g., In Re Okura, 249 B.R. 596,
603 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that a phrase is ambiguous only if it is "capable of
more than one meaning when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who
has examined the context of the entire integrated agreement and who is cognizant of
the customs, practices, usages and terminology as generally understood in the particu-
lar trade or business").
234. Consider, for example, the discussions of the meaning of the pari passu
clause. See, e.g., Fin. Mkts. Law Comm., Issue 79-Pari Passu Clauses (Working Paper,
Mar. 2005), available at http://www.fmlc.org/papers/fmlc79mar_2005.pdf.
235. See, e.g., Ass'N OF CoR-P. TREASURERS (ACT), A GUIDE TO THE LOAN MARKET
ASSOCIATION DOCUMENTATION FOR BORROWERS [hereinafter ACT GUIDE], at 12 (2004),
available at http://www.treasurers.org/technical/resources/lmafinal.pdf ("It can be
harder to negotiate a draft which is presented by lenders as a market standard than, for
example, a draft which is the standard form of a law firm.").
236. Id. at 10. Cf LSTA MODEL CREDIT AGREEMENT PROVISIONS, supra note 231, at 1
(" [E] very effort was made to balance the interests of all constituencies in the syndicated
lending market: agents, investors and borrowers.").
237. ACT GUIDE, supra note 235, at 12.
238. See id. at 12-13.
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negotiation. ' 239 However, although the ACT lists the "increased
costs clause" as a key clause affecting costs, 2 4 0 it does not suggest
that this is a provision that may be negotiated.24' The increased
costs clause is designed to protect lending banks-and subse-
quent acquirers of their interests in any loan-from increased
costs associated with changes in regulatory requirements, for ex-
ample where capital adequacy requirements change over the life
of a loan so that the lender has to have extra capital to cover the
loan. 24 2 The increased costs clause is designed to pass such costs
on to the borrower, but because banks draft the clause and bor-
rowers have limited opportunities to negotiate its terms, the
clause does not give the borrower the benefit of any reduced
regulatory costs. 2 4 3 It is a one-way ratchet in favor of the lenders.
On the other hand, at least in market conditions where bor-
rowers have advantages in negotiating favorable financial terms
for syndicated loans they can also negotiate favorable cove-
nants. 2 4 4 Borrowers' lawyers have recently taken control of the
drafting of some syndicated loan agreements, in part because
the LMA standard forms exist.2 45
Standard form contracts may develop a dominant position
where the market benefits from standardization and/or where
standard-setters and regulators encourage the use of standard
forms as a form of risk management. 246 In the international fi-
239. Id. at 13-14.
240. Id. at 14.
241. See id. But see SJ BERWIN, BASEL II: THE IMPACT ON THE MARGIN 2 (2004),
available at http://www.sjberwin.com/media/pdf/publications/banking/BaselII.pdf
(suggesting that changes in the Basel Capital Accord should mean that borrowers will
want to negotiate to obtain the benefit of reductions in capital requirements that ac-
crue if the borrower's risk profile improves).
242. See generally SJ BERWIN, supra note 241. The lenders can take account of the
impact of capital adequacy rules that apply at the time of signing of the loan agreement
by adjusting the loan pricing. See id. at 3 ("As the effect of Basel II becomes more settled
and as implementation approaches, it is likely that attempts will be made to incorporate
specific Basel II pricing into the provisions of the loan agreement. At that point, Basel
II will effectively drop out of the increased costs clause, just as some years ago the effect
of the current Basel Accord used to be excluded from the increased costs clause once it
had been taken into account in the pricing of transactions.").
243. Cf supra note 241.
244. See, e.g., Catrin Griffiths, Borrowers Revel in Volte-Face of the Syndicated Loan Mar-
ket, THE LAWYER (June 27, 2005), available at http://www.thelawyer.com/cgi-bin/item.
cgi?id=115955&d=1l&h=24&f=23 (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
245. See id.
246. See, e.g., Flanagan, supra note 225, at 255:
One factor that helped keep ISDA's membership committed to the organiza-
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nancial markets some contractual provisions have more of a reg-
ulatory effect than others. For example, provisions of the LMA
agreement regulate the relationship between the agent bank
and the lenders.247
In cases where the market does not use standard forms, in-
ternational standard-setting bodies may encourage market par-
ticipants to develop or use standard form contracts because of
the connection between legal risk and uncertainty. For exam-
ple, commentators say that parties to swap transactions in syn-
thetic collateralized debt obligation structures are not standard-
izing their contracts. 248 In its March 2005 paper on Credit Risk
Transfer, the Joint Forum recommended that "market partici-
pants should aggressively continue their efforts towards stand-
ardization of documentation, including for CDOs and other
more complex products" in order to reduce legal risk.2 49
Standard form contracts often suit the interests of financial
firms and regulators, 250 but they may impose costs on others who
are not involved in the drafting process and who will find it diffi-
cult to negotiate against the standard form provisions. 25 1 At
times the risk reducing aspects of standard forms may be illu-
sory: where firms are parties to transactions using different stan-
tion and its documentation projects was what the members faced if ISDA were
to fall apart. ISDA's initial documentation successes proved that industry par-
ticipants could get good documentation results through ISDA at a fraction of
their previous costs. In addition to reducing costs, ISDA's standardized docu-
ments reduced risk for everyone in the industry.
Id.
247. See generally Primary Documents, supra note 229.
248. See, e.g., Ian Sideris & Simon Puleston Jones, How to Adapt ISDA Documents for
CODOs, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Apr. 2005, at 78, 80 ("Ultimately, it is unlikely that a single
standard form of swap is going to emerge in the synthetic CDO market. The differing
requirements of the rating agencies, the continuing demand by investors for bespoke
products and the desire of investment banks to create new credit products through
which they can make profits in an environment of tightening credit spreads all mitigate
in favour of continuing diversity and complexity in the documentation of synthetic
CDOs.").
249. CREDIT RISK TRANSFER, supra note 189, at 7.
250. See, e.g., Thomas A. Russo, Keynote Address at the 13th Annual Derivative and
Risk Management Conference, Documentation Basis Risk-Hidden Legal Risks in the
Infrastructure of Industry Standard Documentation (Apr. 25, 2003), available at http://
www.ny.frb.org/globaldoc/DocumentationBasisTalk.doc (last visited Oct. 18, 2005)
(explaining that, "[a] fter all, people have more confidence about entering into deriva-
tives trades when they better understand what their rights and obligations are under the
contract.").
251. See supra note 235.
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dard forms, any inconsistencies between the different forms may
cause problems.252 The Global Documentation Steering Com-
mittee in New York works on trying to reconcile differences be-
tween standard forms,255 and has encouraged different organiza-
tions to take account of its work.254
C. Contracts Constrain Regulation
Contracts may constrain or undermine regulation if they
are used to shift risks away from regulated firms onto non-regu-
lated entities. 255 In recent years, banks have changed their rela-
tionships with their customers. Rather than acting as a long
term lender to a business client, a bank prefers to be involved in
arranging a financing facility and to sell its participation in the
facility to others.2 56 One of the advantages of structuring lend-
ing in this way is that the bank's regulatory capital requirement
is controlled.257 Purchasers of loan participations that are not
subject to risk-weighted capital requirements do not have to
worry about having capital to cover the credit risk inherent in
the loan participations. But if the purchaser is a non-bank finan-
cial institution regulators may be concerned about the shifting
of risks from a regulated part of the financial sector to a less
252. See Russo, supra note 250 ("Use of multiple master agreements allows the par-
ties to tailor the basic terms of their financial transactions to the particular transaction.
However, it also results in this documentation basis risk-the risk that transactions that
hedge each other will not exactly have matching terms, because they are documented
on masters that have inherent differences."); see also COUNTERPARTY RISK MGMT. POLICY
GROUP, IMPROVING COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (June 1999), available at
http://www.mfainfo.org/washington/derivaives/Improving%2Counterparty%20risk.
pdf.
253. See, e.g., Global Documentation Steering Comm., Mission Statement, http://
www.ny.frb.org/globaldoc/gd_mission.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
254. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas A. Russo & Jane D. Carlin, Comm. Co-Chairper-
sons, Global Documentation Steering Comm., to Kimberly Summe, Gen. Counsel, Int'l
Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, Inc. (May 7, 2003), available at http://www.ny.frb.org/global
doc/gsdcjfinal.doc (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
255. For example, using credit default swaps to shift the risk of debtor default.
256. For a discussion of loan participations, see, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Intermedi-
ary Risk in a Global Economy, 50 DuKE L.J. 1541, 1557-61 (2001).
257. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Universal Language of International Securitiza-
tion, 12 DuKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 285, 288 (2002) ("If the originator is a bank or similar
financial institution that is required to maintain risk-based capital under the capital-
adequacy guidelines, securitization could also permit the originator to sell receivables
(e.g., loans reflected as assets on a bank's financial statements) for which it would other-
wise be required to maintain capital.") (citation omitted).
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regulated or differently regulated sector.258 Similar issues of
risk-shifting arise in the context of securitizations and CDOs. 2 5 9
The Joint Forum concluded that this issue should be moni-
tored.96 0
Contracts may also constrain regulation where financial
market participants successfully argue that proposed or actual
regulations undermine beneficial market transactions. In the
United States, national banks have been arguing that the states
and municipalities do not have the power to subject them to
controls on predatory lending because of preemption. 261  The
258. Cf Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip E. Strahan, Are Banks Still Important for Financ-
Ing Large Businesses?, CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN., Aug. 1999, at 1, 2, available at
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/current-issues/ci5-12.pdf ("As a result of securitiza-
tion, loans originated by banks are often ultimately held by mutual funds and pension
funds.").
259. See, e.g., CREDIT RISK TRANSFER, supra note 189.
260. See id. at 5 ("With regard to the role of unregulated market participants, the
Working Group believes that market discipline as evidenced through effective
counterparty risk management is an essential element of a well-functioning market-
place. Market participants should seek to ensure that sufficient measures are taken to
address these risks with respect to all counterparties, whether regulated or not. In addi-
tion, supervisory authorities have a legitimate basis for seeking to understand the aggre-
gate amount of credit risk that is being transferred outside of the regulated sector.
While greater information sharing among supervisors, including developing a common
understanding of key concepts and terms, as well as improved analysis of existing and
planned reports provided by regulated firms should provide an increased ability to as-
sess such developments, it will be important to monitor progress in this area closely.");
see also Inv. Subcomm., Int'l Ass'n of Ins. Supervisors [IAIS], IAIS Paper on Credit Risk
Transfer Between Insurance, Banking and Other Financial Sectors Presented to the Financial
Stability Forum, at 26 (Mar. 2003) [hereinafter JAIS Paper], available at http://www.iais-
web.org/03fsfcrt.pdf.
261. State predatory lending statutes tend to be drafted to cover lending within
the state rather than lending by state chartered banks. This makes some sense if bor-
rowers cannot easily distinguish between state chartered and national banks and there-
fore cannot easily work out what rules would regulate predatory lending. Opponents of
predatory lending refer to "asset stripping" or "equity stripping" which can happen be-
cause of large fees charged in relation to the loans.
The primary abuse the North Carolina law, and other subsequent state laws, is
aimed at is preventing equity stripping, which occurs when lenders charge
excessive fees. The problem of excessive fees for the subprime refinancing
borrower is two-fold: the fees seem painless at closing and they are forever.
They are deceptively costless to many borrowers because when the borrower
"pays" them, with a stroke of a pen at closing, he or she does not feel the pain
of counting out thousands of dollars in cash. The borrower parts with the
money only later, when the loan is paid off and the equity value remaining in
his or her home is reduced by the amount of fees owed. And fees are forever
because, even if a responsible lender refinances a family a week later, the bor-
rowers' wealth is still permanently stripped away.
CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, COMMENTS ON OCC WORKING PAPER (Oct. 6, 2003),
172 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:127
OCC has supported this view.262 One argument that lenders
have made to support their arguments for preemption is that
allowing state predatory lending statutes to control the actions of
national banks would impair their ability to securitize loans.963
They argue that this would ultimately deprive borrowers of
credit.
26 4
In a securitization, the originator of income producing as-
sets such as loans will set up a Special Purpose Entity ("SPE") to
hold income-producing assets such as loans and issue securities
to investors.265 If the SPE is sufficiently separate from the origi-
nator, any assets the originator transfers to the SPE will be re-
moved from the originator's balance sheet.266 Investors in secur-
ities issued by the SPE want to be sure that creditors of the origi-
nator are unable to look to the SPE's assets in the event of the
originator's insolvency. 267 Investors in the originator want to be
sure that there is no risk that unhappy investors in the SPE's
available at http://www.predatorylending.org/pdfs/CRLCommentsonOCCWorkingPa-
per.pdf (emphasis in original).
262. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bank Activities and Opera-
tions; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904 Uan. 13, 2004); see also
OCC, Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895 (Jan. 13, 2004).
263. State predatory lending statutes commonly affect not just the original lender
but also assignees of the loan so that remedies available against the original lender
would also be available against assignees who had no opportunity to monitor compli-
ance with the requirements of the statutes. See generally BOND MKT. ASS'N, THE SECON-
DARY MARKET FOR SUBPRIME MORTGAGES. A COMMON SENSE APPROACH TO ADDRESSING
ASSIGNEE LIABILITY THROUGH FEDERAL LEGISLATION (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.
bondmarket.com/Legislative/Subprime-Lending_)Ahitepaper_032904.pdf. This liabil-
ity could significantly reduce the value of asset pools in securitizations:
The secondary market must currently comply with a patchwork of more than
forty varying and sometimes vague and conflicting state and local anti-preda-
tory lending laws. Such a regulatory environment negates many of the effi-
ciencies securitization and the secondary market bring to the subprime mort-
gage market. Anti-predatory lending laws that assign liability to the secondary
market for lending violations that cannot be detected in a review of the loan
documents will ultimately limit subprime borrowers' access to credit.
Id. at 2.
264. See, e.g., CMITY. BANKERS ASS'N OF GEORGIA ET AL., GEORGIA FAIR LENDING ACT:
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 5 (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.namb.org/gov-
ernment affairs/fair lending/GBAissuespredatorylendingwhitepaper.pdf.
265. See generally STANDARD & POOR'S STRUCTURED FIN., LEGAL CRITERIA FOR U.S.
STRUCTURED FINANCE TRANSACTIONS 43-57 (Apr. 2004) [hereinafter S&P LEGAL CRITE-
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securities will seek recourse to the originator.268 Clear and cer-
tain formal legal rules about accounting consolidation, bank-
ruptcy remoteness and the meaning of "true sale" would comfort
all of the participants in securitizations. 269  In the absence of
clear rules, credit rating agencies have stepped in to define what
it takes to make structured financing work by setting detailed
criteria for the rating of structured finance transactions.27 ° Re-
cently rating agencies have addressed the question of the impact
of state predatory lending statutes on securitizations as part of
their general focus on structured finance.27 1 Standard & Poor's
considers various factors, including whether predatory lending
statutes provide for assignee liability, whether the loan categories
affected are clearly defined, what penalties apply and how clear
the statute is (including whether there are any safe harbors). 27 2
Although this example of contracts-the securitization con-
tracts-potentially constraining regulation (the state predatory
lending statutes and also potential federal level regulation of
predatory lending) 211 is a domestic example within the United




271. See, e.g., id. at 103; see also Natalie Abrams, Standard & Poor's Addresses North
Carolina's Anti-Predatory Lending Law (Apr. 2004), available at http://www.securitiza-
tion.net/pdf/sp/NCarolina-Anti-Predatory-19Feb4.pdf.
272. See S&P LEGAL CRITERIA, supra note 265, at 104.
273. The Standard & Poor's analysis in its focus on issues of legal certainty also has
implications for possible federal rules on predatory lending. The Bond Market Associa-
tion supports one bill currently before Congress. See, e.g., Micah S. Green, President,
Bond Mkt. Ass'n, Testimony before U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on
Housing and Community Opportunity, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit, Hearing on Legislative Solutions to Abusive Mortgage Lending Prac-
tices (May 24, 2005), available at http://www.bondmarkets.com/assets/files/Testimony-
Subprime_05-24-05.pdf ("The Responsible Lending Act deals with the problems that
arise from dozens of sometimes vague and conflicting state and local laws by creating a
uniform national standard for the terms under which high-cost loans are made. Criti-
cally important, these terms are objective and measurable. Under this legislation, bor-
rowers facing foreclosure could bring defensive claims against loan assignees under
certain circumstances. Assignees could also be the subject of affirmative claims, or
those brought outside of the context of defending against a specific foreclosure claim,
unless they could prove that a reasonable level of loan review would not have revealed
the lending violation in question. By observing an objective standard for loan review
that could reasonably be expected to screen loans with potential predatory lending
problems, secondary market participants can avoid potential liability. The Responsible
Lending Act also provides purchasers with a 'right to cure,' or the opportunity to
amend a loan and compensate the borrower when they identify loans made in violation
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made in the EU that EU level banking rules preempt State ac-
tions to protect domestic banking customers like those the states
have been taking in the United States. 274 Eventually, the WTO
services agreement may produce similar preemptive effects at
the global level.
To the extent that contracts, particularly standard form con-
tracts, can constrain or limit regulation, it is worrying that the
processes which produce the standard form contracts are private
and opaque to outsiders and that they do not tend to allow input
from people who may be affected by them.
D. Regulation Constrains Contracts
At the same time as contracts may constrain or limit regula-
tion, financial firms need to worry about how existing legal rules
may affect the contractual arrangements they believe they have
made, and about how changes to legal rules may affect their con-
tracts. One result of such anxiety is the type of lobbying activity
discussed in Section I above.
Some types of legal uncertainty may not matter if market
participants can agree to ignore the uncertainty. Within a ho-
mogenous community transactions may derive their binding ef-
fect from sources other than state-centered law. 275 But actors in
the international financial markets are less homogenous than
they used to be and they are more likely to resort to litigation to
resolve disputes than they were in the past.27 6
of the terms set out in the bill. All claims would be limited to actual damages unless a
borrower can prove reckless indifference on the part of the assignee.").
274. See, e.g., Council Directive No. 2000/12, O.J. L 126/1 (2000), available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/l126/1_12620000526en00010059.
pdf (including a general rule of home control of credit institutions which is the
equivalent of pre-emption); see also Press Release, European Commission, Banking:
Commission Requests Italy to Amend Law on Excessive Interest Rates (July 25, 2003),
available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/1118
&format=HTML&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Oct. 18, 2005)
(describing Commission challenge to Italian rules criminalizing usury).
275. See, e.g., R.B. Ferguson, Commercial Expectations and the Guarantee of the Law:
Sales Transactions in Mid-Nineteenth Century England, in LAW, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY,
1750-1914: EssAYs IN THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 192, 194-98 (G. R. Rubin & David
Sugarman eds., 1984) (arguing that stock exchange transactions in Britain in the nine-
teenth century were secure, despite being legally unenforceable).
276. C.f Frank B. Cross, America the Adversarial, 89 VA. L. REv. 189, 195 (2003)
(reviewing Robert A. Kagan's ADVERSAmjAL LEGALISM: THE AMERMCAN WAY OF LAw
(2001), which notes the increasing rate of litigation in the United States).
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When litigation does occur, market participants frequently
argue that courts should give effect to the agreements they have
concluded and should interpret the law to facilitate this. Finan-
cial trade associations may submit amicus briefs in litigation to
argue for the market's view. In some places governmental au-
thorities or quasi-governmental authorities encourage the idea
that courts should avoid applying the law in unexpected ways.277
In the U.K., the Bank of England appointed a Legal Risk Review
Committee,278 then a Financial Law Panel,279 and most recently
a Financial Markets Law Committee to address issues of legal
risk.2 8
0
Regulation may constrain contracts by limiting what a finan-
cial firm can achieve by contract. Uncertainties about how
courts and regulators will interpret contracts create legal risks
that financial institutions need to address as part of their overall
risk management strategy required by their regulators.
III. PRIVATE SECTOR REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURS
Whether financial transactions take place on regulated mar-
kets or not, they need institutional support, including support
from rules, whether those rules are derived from statutes and
regulations or from contracts. Financial trade associations act as
regulatory entrepreneurs in developing rules that participants in
277. See, e.g., Final Report of the Legal Risk Review Committee (Oct. 1992) (on file
with author). The Committee noted that: "[M]arkets cannot function efficiently with-
out a strong legal foundation. Promoting legal certainty, even though it is not the only
relevant concern, is therefore of fundamental medium- to long-term importance." Id. at
1.2.
278. See id. The statement by Millett, J. in In re Charge Card Services Ltd. that "a
charge in favour of a debtor of his own indebtedness to the chargor is conceptually
impossible" was another factor. See [1987] Ch. 150; see also Re BCCI No. 8 [1998] A.C.
214 (Hoffman, L.) ("The doctrine of conceptual impossibility ... has excited a good
deal of heat and controversy in banking circles; the Legal Risk Review Committee, set
up in 1991 by the Bank of England to identify areas of obscurity and uncertainty in the
law affecting financial markets and propose solutions, said that a very large number of
submissions from interested parties expressed disquiet about this ruling. It seems clear
that documents purporting to create such charges have been used by banks for many
years.").
279. The Financial Law Panel ceased operations in March 2002. The Bank of En-
gland had decided that it could not indefinitely provide open-ended support to the
Panel. See BANK OF ENGLAND, ANNUAL REPORT 2002, at 5 (May 2002), available at http://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/annualreport/2002report.pdf.
280. The Financial Markets Law Committee's web site is at http://www.fmlc.org.
20051
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the financial markets follow. 281  Earlier sections of this Article
addressed the lobbying activities of financial trade associations
and their actions in developing standard form contracts. But fi-
nancial trade associations also seek to influence market behavior
by the development of instruments such as guidelines and mar-
ket standards that are designed to affect the behavior of market
participants. 28 2 Although market standards do not seek in them-
selves to produce legal effects, they may in fact produce legal
effects if they are incorporated in contracts or if regulations re-
fer to them.283
The financial industry has produced a host of standards,
codes, and guidelines covering many different subjects. 284 For
example, the Bond Market Association has published Practice
Guidelines for trading in distressed bonds, 285 and for GSE Euro-
pean callable securities. 286 The European Securitisation Forum
has published securitization market practice guidelines.2 8 7
Sometimes market standards are designed to fend off regula-
tion. 288 For example, in March 2005, during a period of na-
tional and international debates about whether credit rating
281. Some financial trade associations are recognized as self-regulatory organiza-
tions in states' formal financial regulatory systems. Others exercise rule-making func-
tions because their membership wishes them to do so without any formal role in any
state's financial regulatory structure.
282. See, e.g., BOND MKT. ASS'N, PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR TRADING IN DISTRESSED
BONDS (Sept. 2004) [hereinafter DISTRESSED BONDS], available at http://www.bondmar-
ket.com/assets/files/Practice_Guidelines-for Trading in-DistressedBonds.pdf; see
also BOND MKT. ASS'N, PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR TRADING IN GSE EUROPEAN CALLABLE
SECURITIES (updated May 13, 2004) [hereinafter GSE SECURITIES], available at http://
www.bondmarket.com/assets/files/2004PracticeGuideforTradeGSEEuroCal-
lableSec.pdf; EUROPEAN SECURITISATION FORUM, SECURITISATION MARKET PRACTICE
GUIDELINES (June 2004) [hereinafter SECURITISATION MARKET PRACTICE GUIDELINES],
available at http://www.europeansecuritisation.com/pubs/SecuritisaionMarketPrac-
ticeGuidelinesjune_2004.pdf.
283. The U.K.'s Takeover Panel was set up in 1968 as a non-governmental body to
regulate takeover transactions in the U.K., administering the City Code on Takeovers
and Mergers. More recently, financial regulators in the U.K. have required people au-
thorized to carry on investment business in the U.K. to comply with the provisions of
the Code and to "cold shoulder" persons who do not comply with the Code. See, e.g.,
FSA, ENDORSEMENT OF THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS AND THE RULES Gov-
ERNING SUBSTANTIAL ACQUISITIONS OF SHARES, CONSULTATION PAPER 87 3 (Apr. 2001),
available at http://vw.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp87.pdf.
284. See generally supra note 282.
285. See generally DISTRESSED BONDS, supra note 282.
286. See generally GSE SECURITIES, supra note 282.
287. See generally SECURITISATION MARKET PRACTICE GUIDELINES, supra note 282.
288. See, e.g., ASS'N OF CORP. TREASURERS ET AL., CODE OF STANDARD PRACTICES FOR
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agencies should be subjected to formal regulation, a group of
organizations-representing the corporate treasury function of
issuers rather than ratings agencies-published a Code of Con-
duct for Credit Rating Agencies. 9  Sometimes regulators en-
courage trade associations to develop solutions to problems in
the market.290 Market standards may be useful in circumstances
where regulatory solutions are infeasible: For example, emerg-
ing market debtors, the financial institutions that invest in their
debt, and trade associations have agreed principles for the
emerging debt market. 29'
Private standard-setters may have significant influence on
the behavior of market participants through formal recognition
of their role. In 2002, for example, the EU adopted a regulation
mandating the use of International Accounting Standards by
publicly traded EU companies. 292  International Accounting
Standards are developed by the International Accounting Stan-
dards Board ("IASB") ,293 a non-governmental organization
which is funded by private sector firms. 29 4 Commentators have
suggested that the dependence of standards-setters on private
PARTICIPANTS IN THE CREDIT RATING PROCESS (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.trea-
surers.org/technical/papers/resources/cspfinal_mar05.pdf.
289. See id.
290. See, e.g., Edna Young, Fin. Crime Sector Manager, FSA, Speech at the British
Bankers' Association 4th Annual Fraud Conference Uun. 27, 2005), available at http://
www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2005/0627_ey.shtml (last
visited Oct. 18, 2005) ("Trade associations can play a key role in collating this informa-
tion and providing advice to their members on how to manage their fraud risks more
effectively. We see them as providing the lead in developing and disseminating best
practice.").
291. See INST. OF INr'L FIN., PRINCIPLES FOR STABLE CAPITAL FLOWS AND FAIR DEBT
RESTRUCTURING IN EMERGING MARKETS (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.iif.com/
data/public/principles-final_005.pdf; see also Bedford et al., supra note 211, at 6 ("An
important recent development in 'soft law' has been the Principles for Stable Capital
Flows and Fair Debt Restructurings in Emerging Markets (hereafter, the Principles)
agreed between some key trade associations and a group of sovereign borrowers. The
Principles constitute a set of voluntary guidelines designed to add further structure and
predictability to the relationship between sovereign debtors and their creditors beyond
that contained in contracts.").
292. See Council Regulation No. 1606/2002, OJ. L 243/1 (2002); see also Commis-
sion Regulation No. 1725/2003, O.J. L 261/1 (2003); Commission Regulation No. 707/
2004, O.J. L 111/3 (2004).
293. See Council Regulation No. 1606/2002, supra note 292, art. 2.
294. See International Accounting Standards Board [LASB], Organization Descrip-
tion, http://www.valuebasedmanagement.net/organizationsiasb.html (last visited
Sept. 22, 2005) (noting that the IASB is a "privately-funded accounting standard set-
ter").
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sector funding creates conflicts of interest that raise questions
about the legitimacy of the standards it promulgates. 295 The
IASB has recognized these concerns during a number of recent
constitutional reviews. 296 And, imitating intergovernmental bod-
ies such as IOSCO, the IASB has focused on increasing the trans-
parency of its standards-making processes.2 9 7
Other private sector firms act as regulatory entrepreneurs
by setting criteria for market transactions.298 Credit rating agen-
cies assess the financial condition of issuers of securities in the
capital markets, and their decisions about how to treat different
liabilities can have an impact on the issuers' ability to raise funds
in the capital markets. 299 Credit rating agencies also set detailed
295. See McCreevy, supra note 13, at 5 ("The standard setters are currently spon-
sored by voluntary contributions from contributors ranging from central banks to listed
companies, which raises potential issues of conflict of interest."); see also Michael Peel,
Accounting Standards Body Criticised for Secrecy, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 4, 2002, at 28
(describing the criticism levied against the International Accounting Standards Com-
mittee for keeping its list of donors secret); BIS, THE ROLE OF RATINGS IN STRUCTURED
FINANCE: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS, at 25 (Jan. 2005), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/cgfs23.pdf ("Potential conflicts arise from the fact that ratings are paid for by
issuers rather than investors .... ").
296. See, e.g., Letter from IAIS to Tom Seidenstein, Dir. of Operations and Secre-
tary, LASC, Re: Comments on Identifying Issues for the LASC Foundation Constitution
Review (Feb. 11, 2004), available at http://www.iaisweb.org/190IASConstitutioncom-
mcntsllFebruary2004.pdf ("[W]e recognize the importance of bringing to bear the
highest calibre of technical expertise and unbiased professional judgment to standard-
setting efforts. At the same time, we believe that the overall process for developing
these standards must include sufficient transparency and accountability to ensure that
strengths, without appropriate checks and balances, do not risk becoming weak-
nesses."); see also IASC FOUNDATION CONSTITUTION (July 2005), available at http://www.
iasb.org/uploaded-files/documents/8 11_iascf-constitution.pdf (mandating the devel-
opment of "high quality, understandable and enforceable global accounting standards
that require high quality, transparent and comparable information in financial state-
ments").
297. See INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMM. FOUND., DUE PROCESS OF IASB,
DRAFT HANDBOOK OF CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS (Apr. 2005), available at http://
www.iasb.org/uploaded files/documents/8_137DueProcess.pdf.
298. See, e.g., S&P LEGAL CRITERIA, supra note 265, at 7 (describing criteria for
structured finance transactions).
299. See, e.g., OECD, Corporate Pension Fund Liabilities and Funding Gaps, 88 FIN.
MKT. TRENDS 69, 91 (Mar. 2005) ("Rating agencies have warned that estimated deficits
in company pension schemes are similar to debt. It had previously been thought that
credit ratings agencies regarded pensions as long-term liabilities with little negative li-
quidity implications, at least in the case of those jurisdictions where pensions rank
along with non-preferred and unsecured debt in the event of insolvency. Across coun-
tries, there are differences in the status of pension creditors, but this status may be
subject to change in some countries. For example, making the status of pension credi-
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING
criteria for structured finance transactions. 30 0 Firms that wish to
sell securities in a structured financing need to acquire a rating
from a credit rating agency in order for the securities to be mar-
ketable."' They therefore have to ensure that they meet the rat-
ing agencies' criteria. 0 2 Rating agencies are also affecting inves-
tors' willingness to invest in structured credit products. °3 0  Credit
ratings are set to influence the level of capital banks are required
to hold when they are used as a measure of a corporate's risk. 0 4
CONCLUSION
Contracts and regulation intersect in complex ways in the
international financial markets. This Article examines some of
the ways in which non-governmental actors, in particular finan-
cial trade associations, influence regulation in the international
financial markets through lobbying, through the development of
standard form contracts and through their own quasi-regulatory
initiatives. Although some of the ways in which this influence is
exercised are apparent because of disclosures by governmental
and inter-governmental standard-setters and because of disclo-
sures by the financial firms and their trade associations, others
are less transparent. Larger firms with better resources are able
to participate more effectively than smaller firms in these formal
tors 'preferred' rather than 'unsecured' is likely to affect ratings, particularly for com-
panies where financial indebtedness is already high.").
300. See, e.g., S&P LEGAL CRITERIA, supra note 265.
301. See generally Public Bonds, Rating Agencies, Rating Systems and Municipal Credit,
Overview, available at http://www.publicbonds.org/majorplayers/overratings.htm (last
visited Oct. 18, 2005).
302. See, e.g., BIS, THE ROLE OF RATINGS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE: ISSUES AND IMPLI-
CATIONS (Jan. 2005), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs23.pdf.
303. See, e.g., BIS, 75TH ANNUAL REPORT, 1 APRIL 2004-31 MARCH 2005, at 118 (June
27, 2005), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2005e.pdf ("[S]tructured
credit products are very complex securities and the risks involved might not be fully
appreciated by all market participants. The covenants of many CDO contracts can be
difficult to comprehend and deal complexity has posed many modelling challenges.
Although efforts have been made to develop more realistic pricing models and risk
management systems, many market participants are still building up their analytical
capacity. One consequence is that rating agencies have played a key role in the devel-
opment of the market. However, there is relatively little experience with the perform-
ance of ratings on CDOs, and rules of thumb employed by investors in using ratings on
corporate bonds may be misleading when applied to highly leveraged structured instru-
ments.").




and informal processes of regulation and quasi-regulation. Con-
sumers tend to be distanced from these processes by lack of re-
sources, by lack of expertise and because they fail to meet the
eligibility criteria for participation. °" Thus, in critical ways,
these governance processes do not fit well with ideas either of
top-down governance or of bottom-up governance.
305. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
